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Notwithstanding the results of Canada's 1992 national referendum
-- where "the aboriginal package" went down to defeat,
along with the rest of the constitutional proposals, among both
aboriginal and non-aboriginal voters -- prospects for dramatic
changes to the look of aboriginal-governmental relations in Canada
are still alive and well. My interests in this paper are to examine
what those relations have been, as well as factors which may influence
and/or should be considered in future relations. Particular attention
will then be paid to possible futures in the realm of aboriginal
justice.
Though calls for changes in the realms of both aboriginal-governmental
relations and aboriginal justice come from many quarters, just
what these changes might entail, and how they will dovetail with
the dominant Euro-Canadian governmental and justice systems, are
still a matter of some discussion and debate. The current paper
begins with the assertion that choices among future policy alternatives
would benefit from consideration of past relations between Canada's
indigenous peoples and the colonial and federal governments. Indeed,
it is guided by the belief that any proposals which do not
consider the past in their formulation and implementation are
doomed to repeat it. Accordingly, the first half of this paper
reviews some of the history of aboriginal-governmental relations
in Canada, while the second half focusses specifically on issues
of aboriginal justice.
A Historical Preamble
Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian History
There is an incredible irony concerning Canada's indigenous
peoples. On the one hand, there is considerable oral history evidence
from aboriginal peoples, reaffirmed by archaeological evidence,
that native peoples have indeed populated this continent since
"time immemorial" -- long enough for aboriginal ancestors
to have witnessed even the ice ages that affected the North American
continent between 10,000 and 40,000 years ago (e.g., see McMillan,
1988). On the other hand, the European (and academic) bias toward
paper documentation, coupled with the fact that Aboriginal cultures
have been oral and/or used other media (e.g., wampum belts) to
transmit information from generation to generation, have left
aboriginal peoples among those peoples who, from the European
perspective, have no history (cf., Wolf, 1982). As Stanley (1983)
stated:
"Because the Indian had no written records when the first
white man reached this continent, he was dismissed by the white
man as having no past." (p.1)
Stanley's observation is itself ahistorical, however, since
European histories of North America, and depictions of aboriginals
within it, have themselves changed considerably as the relationship
between whites and aboriginals has varied over the last 500 years.
In that sense, "North American history", and "aboriginal
history" within it, are better seen, as Fisher & Coates
(1988) have argued, as social constructions. In this regard, they
approvingly cite another historian (K.R. Howe) who
"...pointed out that, because history is what we choose
to see, 'the past has no independent existence'. Indeed, it might
well be argued that history has some of the same functions in
western cultures as mythology does in Indian cultures: it validates
the past in terms that are meaningful for the present." (p.3)
The changing depictions of aboriginal peoples who do appear
in Canadian histories seem to offer a classic example of those
dominating the present constructing the past in the service of
their own interests.
Various authors have documented the change in European views
of aboriginal peoples in formal histories written during the post-contact
years2. When the indigenous peoples were of use to Europeans --
for survival in what to Europeans was an unforgiving "new
world", as military allies, and during the years that Europeans
and aboriginals engaged in the fur trade -- the dominant image
was of the "noble savage" (Fisher, 1992), and histories
of the time both included, and were respectful of, the natives
(Trigger, 1988).
By the early 1800s, however, and particularly after the War
of 1812, survival per se was no longer an issue, external
military threats were unlikely, and the fur trader voyageurs gave
way to waves of immigrant settlers seeking an agricultural land
base. But as conflict over land use arose, the images of Indians
began to change. Where once the Indians had been most helpful
and useful, now they were an obstacle to European visions of progress.
The "noble savage" was now merely "savage";
the same Indians who were once seen as knowledgeable, brave, and
loyal, were now perceived as ignorant, cruel, treacherous, blood-thirsty,
dirty, and immoral (Fisher, 1992; Francis, 1992; Trigger, 1988;
Walker, 1983). Certainly this helped to justify colonial policies
which emerged at the time, most of which focussed on getting Indians
out of the way, so that the interests of "civilization and
progress" might be served.
In the post-Confederation period, aboriginal peoples have
yet to be recognized as one of Canada's founding nations (e.g.,
see Harper, 1991, on this point), thereby making them "irrelevant"
for inclusion in more recent "mainstream" national histories,
from which they have been and continue to be conspicuously absent
(e.g., see Walker, 1983). To the extent that "mainstream"
histories are justifications of the present, any significant representation
of aboriginal peoples in the major governmental structures of
our time would require a story to show the "inevitability"
and "just-ness" of such a presence. The corollary is
that so, too must their absence be accounted for, and most of
the "standard" Canadian histories (e.g., Creighton,
1974; Woodcock, 1990) do so by depicting natives as savages who
were too ignorant even to be grateful for the Europeans' "gift"
of "civilization", as stage props for what was seen
(by Europeans) as a primarily European drama in the "New
World", or by ignoring them entirely (cf., Walker, 1983).
But if history can be revised once, then it must be open to
further reconsideration, and the last two decades have seen considerable
transition in how aboriginals have been perceived in historical
context. Part of this is due to aboriginals themselves, who must
be acknowledged for the way they have continued asserting their
past, even in the face of considerable suppression for more than
a century. Contributions have also been made in the form of an
unprecedented amount of primary research in the last two decades
in the realm of native history (e.g., see Fisher & Coates,
1988; Walker, 1983). Perhaps not surprisingly, the contemporary
'rediscovery' of native peoples and their contributions to Canadian
history has been associated with reconsideration of Canadian government
Indian policies.
Traditions in Canadian Indian Policy
Tennant (1985) and Dyck (1991) are among those to have described
Canadian Indian policy over most of the last 125 or more years
as clearly and consistently assimilationist in its objectives.
Tobias (1983) summarized by saying "Protection, civilization,
and assimilation have always been the goals of Canada's Indian
policy." (p.39). Protection was required because of
the belief that Indians were but children, who would otherwise
be vulnerable to Europeans' exploitation. Civilization
was the Holy Grail that the new settlers had to offer. Though
it might take some time, the Indians could be educated, for their
own alleged benefit, to a new religion (Christianity), vocation
(farming), and social structures (which emphasized such elements
as parliamentary democracy, individual rights, and notions of
private property). Assimilation into the broader society
was the long range goal.
McCaskill (1983) notes the ironies involved. "After Indians
were no longer useful for economic or military purposes, the government
established a system of reserves designed to 'protect and civilize'
native people in order that they might eventually assimilate.
... In theory, Indians were to learn to exercise self-determination
and assume responsibilities for their own affairs." (p.289).
But, "Encouraged to become self-sufficient, the Indian was
prevented from being so in almost every area -- economic, political,
and administrative." (p.290). McCaskill locates much of the
problem in the paradox of the policy itself, i.e., its goal was
to bring natives into Canadian society, but it did so by setting
them apart and denying them any role in the country's institutional
apparatus.
"Viewing the situation as a problem of legitimation (including
legitimation of the legal system), we can see that while government
agents attempted to justify the values and norms of Canadian society,
they made little effort to explain the institutional order by
affording Indians any meaningful experience with the institutions
themselves." (p.290).
McCaskill (1983) is among those who have referred to this
general attitude as colonialism:
"Colonialism involves a relationship which leaves one
side dependent on the other to define the world. At the individual
level, colonialism involves a situation where one individual is
forced to relate to another on terms unilaterally defined by the
other." (p.289).
More recently, Dyck (1991) has used the concept of tutelage:
"Reduced to its essentials, tutelage comprises a form
of restraint or care exercised by one party over another as well
as the condition of being subjected to such protection or guardianship.
... [T]here is an implicit understanding of the unequal status
and power of the two parties. What is unusual about the particular
form of tutelage experienced by aboriginal peoples in Canada is
not that it has involved the exercise of power by one party to
guide and shape the conduct of another; ... [it is that their
experience] has been based neither upon a contractual agreement
nor a negotiated understanding but upon the power of one side
to regulate the behaviour of the other in accordance with a set
of unilaterally selected purposes." (p.24).
A key word in both the above quotes is "unilateral",
i.e., where, because of the presumed inferiority of one group
and the presumed superiority of the other, the allegedly superior
group feels justified in the imposition of its motives, methods,
and understandings. Such was the case not only in the realm of
aboriginal justice, but in virtually every domain of aboriginal
life. It was primarily through the Indian Act and its implementors
-- the federal Department of Indian Affairs (DIA; created in 1880;
later to be the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development,
or DIAND) -- that the imposition was realized.
The federal government was both relentless and imaginative
in the means it employed to assimilate the Indian. The very definition
of who was "an Indian", and hence, who also was not,
was one of the elements put under government control in the first
Indian Act. It is noteworthy that the continuation of Indian
status was defined on the father's side: aboriginal men who married
non-aboriginal women remained Indian, while aboriginal women who
married non-aboriginal men lost their Indian status, as did their
children. This reflected European patriarchy, and also established
lineages which conflicted with the matrilineal descent practised
by many First Nations (e.g., see Joseph, 1991; Wilson, 1985).
The history of Indian administration in Canada from that point
onward, is one of increasing control by government authorities
over natives. A partial list includes: (a) attempts to suppress
"pagan rituals" and promote Christian religions by banning
important cultural festivals such as the Potlatch, Thirst Dance,
and Sun Dance; (b) efforts to suppress traditional native structures
of self-government, and to teach the elements of English-style
"good government", through imposition of elected "band
councils"; (c) diminishing the influence of natural parents
and heightening the in loco parentis role of the Christian
churches by requiring children to leave their parents and attend
government-sponsored residential schools where use of Indian languages
and other aspects of "Indian-ness" were punished; (d)
controlling aboriginals' efforts to organize and pursue aboriginal
rights by initiating a "pass" system where Indians could
not leave their reserve without permission of the Indian Agent,
and making it illegal to hire a lawyer to pursue any form of aboriginal
rights or land claim; and (e) undermining aboriginal justice structures
by giving paramountcy to the Indian Act and other federal
and provincial law (e.g., see Cole & Chaikin, 1990; Dyck,
1991; Francis, 1992; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991; Tennant, 1985;
Wilson, 1985).
Though there was continual native resistance throughout this
process -- primarily by taking aspects of culture "underground"
(e.g., with practices like the Potlatch; see Cole & Chaikin,
1990) or simply refusing cooperation (e.g., by holding "show"
elections where traditional chiefs would be "elected";
or simply by not seeking "special" status via enfranchisement;
see, for example, Francis, 1992; McCaskill, 1983) -- the power
of the State is considerable.
The legacy of Canada's assimilative strategies has been horrific,
not the least of which has been the Canadian government's "success"
at creating conflict where, before, none had existed. Indeed,
Machiavelli would have been proud of the effective implementation
of divide-and-conquer strategies. Egalitarian social relations
among native men and women degenerated over several generations
of patriarchy imposed by the Indian Act, and the colonials
who implemented it (see Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992; Payne,
1992). The exclusionary "citizenship" rules, which stripped
native women who married whites of their Indian status, ripped
into the heart of aboriginal First Nations, many of whom had traditionally
bequeathed titles and responsibilities through matrilineage (Greschner,
1992; Joseph, 1991; Wilson, 1985). Traditional forms of governance
were undermined by a century of funding Band Councils, with the
result that, in many communities, Band Councils and more traditional
structures now conflict over funding and tribal policies (e.g.,
Hornung, 1991; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991; Tennant, 1990; and
York & Pindera, 1991). Parental authority was undermined by
the residential schools, with their own horrific dynamics, resulting
in several generations of natives who lacked effective and compassionate
parental models, thereby creating its own dysfunctions (e.g.,
Hammersmith, 1992). Further, tribal elders, who gained that status
by virtue of their demonstrations of wisdom in dealing with matters
such as governance and justice, were denied those opportunities
by the forced creation of Band Councils, and the imposed paramountcy
of a foreign justice system (Jackson, 1992; Ross, 1992). All told,
the Government of Canada has acted more like a government intent
on cultural genocide than one concerned with executing its fiduciary
responsibilities to the full benefit of native peoples.
Canadians might wish that this treatment of native peoples
would be a part of some distant past, but it is not. The law against
the Potlatch -- which had long since grown to cover "any
Indian festival or gathering" -- was removed as recently
as 1951, as was the law against hiring a lawyer to pursue Land
Claims in the Courts (see Cole & Chaikin, 1990; Tennant, 1990).
The residential schools, and the forced attendance and family
separation which went along with them, ended only in the 1960s.
As recently as 1969, a document as significant as the Trudeau-Chrétien
White Paper -- which proposed to completely dispose of special
"Indian" status -- was generated completely without
aboriginal participation (Weaver, 1981).
Prospects for Change
There are still persons who would argue that everything would
be fine if aboriginals could only accept being "just like
us". But the more optimistic among us might argue that the
current zeitgeist is one which reflects a major transition
in relations between First Nations peoples, other Canadians, and
their respective governments. Indeed, there is evidence of burgeoning
sensitivity to the role of aboriginals in the history of this
continent (e.g., see Berger, 1991; Wright, 1992), of receptivity
to aboriginal assertions of self-determination (e.g., see papers
by an array of participants in Cassidy, 1991b; see also Cassidy
& Bish, 1989), and of some degree of embarrassment with respect
to Euro-Canadian treatment of aboriginals in the past (e.g., see
Tennant, 1992b). Certainly First Nations issues have risen on
the national agenda, aboriginal participation is more likely whenever
government is anticipating changes in policy affecting aboriginals,
and, notwithstanding the defeat of the constitutional proposals
in the 1992 referendum, it would seem that government is quite
prepared to move ahead (e.g., see "Time for action on native
justice issues, Campbell says", Globe & Mail,
26 November 1992, p.A5). There is a long way to go until the country
and its structures reflect a recognition of three rather than
two Founding Nations; nonetheless, there has also been much progress.
The question now is over what direction to follow, as well as
the process by which those directions will be determined.
Transitions in Canada's Indian Policy
Although there is evidence that "mainstream" Canada
is rediscovering aboriginal history, and that governmental aboriginal
policy is also being reconsidered, any single attribution of "why"
this might be occuring now would be sheer speculation. Although
any list of factors is bound to be incomplete, the influences
I will consider here include (a) the emergence of largesse toward
native peoples and native issues after World War II; (b) the catalytic
impact of the Trudeau-Chretien White Paper of 1969; (c) the resurgence
of native power in the summer of 1990, especially as manifest
in the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, and the armed standoff
at Oka, Quebec; (d) the cumulative impact of decisions in the
Courts, and especially the Supreme Court of Canada, with respect
to aboriginal title and aboriginal rights; and (e) international
influences, especially as revealed in the emergence of aboriginal
supranational organizations, and in developments at the UnitedNations.
Postwar Largesse
One might suggest that current developments are merely an
outgrowth of shifting attitudes toward aboriginals which began
in the years following World War II. Tennant (1990) notes that
an appreciation of Indian contributions to the war effort (particularly
because natives were not subject to conscription, and hence their
participation was voluntary), growing realization of the material
poverty in which most Indians lived, and the failure of government
policies to improve their lot, all combined to spur renewed concern
about 'the Indian problem'. In support of that perspective, one
can look back to the 1950s and acknowledge removal of some of
the more repressive aspects of the Indian Act (such as
prohibition of the potlatch, and prohibition of making inquiries
or hiring a lawyer to pursue land claims) in 1951, or the granting
of the federal vote in 1960.
An array of committees and commissions were soon looking into
various aspects of 'the Indian problem', but no significant policy
initiatives were undertaken. The biggest problem seemed to be
rooted in enduring differences between the aboriginals, who pushed
for resolution of land claims and aboriginal rights issues, and
the government and its bureaucracy, who wanted the Indians to
start acting a bit more like everyone else. The attitude is captured
well by a letter from Arthur Laing (Minister of Indian Affairs
from 1966-1968) to Gordon Robertson (a senior civil servant),
in which he claimed that the main problem with the Indians was
that they had not yet accepted the values the government wanted
them to accept: "The prime condition in the progress of the
Indian people must be the development by themselves of a desire
for the goals which we think they should want." (letter dated
19 October 1963; cited by Weaver, 1981, p.48).
The major contributions made by the various committees and
commissions of the 1950s and 1960s was to show very clearly the
material impoverishment that government and its policies had wrought.
Tables and graphs took turns showing higher infant mortality rates,
shorter life expectancies, lower educational attainments, higher
incarceration rates, and the negative end of every other social
indicator on which natives and non-natives could be compared.
The White Paper
A second oft-noted "turning point" is the Trudeau-Chretien
White Paper of 1969, which finally offered a completely new look
in Indian policy. Its central focus was essentially to get rid
of 'Indian' as any sort of 'special' ethnic or racial category:
within a few years, there would be no Indian Act, no Department
of Indian Affairs, and no vestiges of special status beyond those
individual rights that were accorded to all Canadian citizens.
Weaver (1981) suggests that the White Paper was very much a reflection
of Trudeau's western-liberal perspective of the "just society",
in which it was believed that no group should receive the "special"
status that would be implied by recognition of their collective
rights; justice was best achieved through each person being accorded
and guaranteed his or her individual rights. According to this
view, Indians were the victims of discrimination pure and simple
-- if only their individual rights were guaranteed, then they
would soon move to full participation in a grand egalitarian society.
There were a few problems with the White Paper, however, not
the least of which was that the government had created it without
ever consulting the natives about the abrupt shift in direction
it proposed for them. The unilateral declaration was in fact particularly
insulting to natives because during the time the White Paper and
its policies were being formulated within government, the federal
government (including Ministers Chretien and Andras) was concurrently
engaged in a series of consultation meetings with Indian leaders
on "possible changes to the Indian Act". These,
ironically, had been billed as significant evidence of a "new
relationship" where government consultation of natives on
matters of importance to them was assured. For natives, who knew
nothing about the proposed termination policies until the day
the White Paper was released, the consultations were shown to
be a clear sham, and the assimilation objectives of the government's
Indian policy were abundantly evident (Weaver, 1981).
Tennant (1990) is among many those who report that reaction
to the White Paper by Indians was relatively quick, and uniformly
negative. But there was an inspirational element, as well. Much
to the chagrin of those in the Prime Minister's Office, who hoped
to appease the natives rather than arouse them (see Weaver, 1981),
the White Paper is identified by many as the catalyst which brought
First Nations citizens and leaders together, and showed their
power as a collective entity.
A Summer of Discontent
A third "turning point" is the summer of 1990, in
which two significant events occured. In the first, Manitoba aboriginal
MLA Elijah Harper effectively killed the Meech Lake Accord, when
he voted 'no' to a procedural vote which required unanimity for
discussion to be extended. Later that summer, an extended and
armed encounter ensued when the Mohawks of Kanesatake and Kahnawake
disagreed with the town of Oka over their plans for expanding
a golf course onto Mohawk land (see Hornung, 1991; York &
Pindera, 1991).
Both events have come to symbolize the growing resolve among
aboriginal peoples to assert their identities and to demand an
end to injustice. Oka, in particular, seems to be taking on mythical
proportion, with everyone who spoke about aboriginal rights in
that year deriving their own "lesson from Oka". Elijah
Harper (1991) referred to Oka as an important "first act
of unity" among native peoples: "What Oka proved is
that aboriginal people are still united and concentrated on specific
issues such as land claims and sovereignty." (p.165).
Politicians also commented, mostly in a manner which drew
lessons verifying the validity of their own actions. Then-premier
Tony Penikett of the Yukon, who had been negotiating an agreement
with Yukon Indians, felt that "...the one overriding lesson
of Oka is that there is no good alternative to negotiating seriously
and in good faith." (1991; p.143). Ontario Premier Bob Rae,
who had been actively promoting recognition and negotiation of
aboriginal issues among other First Ministers, opined that Oka
"...drove everyone to understand that something has to give,
and something has to move." (1991; p.153).
The Courts
The Canadian courts have been the subject of mixed reviews
by observers of aboriginal affairs. To fully appreciate these,
one must first recognize that the main sources of documentary
authority3 for the advancement of aboriginal interests are perceived
to include (1) the Royal Proclamation of 1763; (2) the
Constitution Act, 1867; and (3) the Constitution Act,
1982 (e.g., see Cassidy, 1991c; Clark, 1990; Krasnick, 1991;
J.Sanders, 1991).
The Royal Proclamation, in particular, has taken on
the symbolic value of an aboriginal Magna Carta, since it shows
the British dealing with the Indians on a nation-to-nation level,
and clearly reflects the aboriginal recollection that Europeans
were welcome to come and share, but not to monopolize, the continent.
It affirmed that the "...several Nations or Tribes with whom
We are connected ... should not be molested or disturbed..."
in Indian lands, and lands reserved for their use (Royal Proclamation
reprinted in Getty & Lussier, 1983, pp.29-37).
As Clark (1990) describes, the Royal Proclamation is
a decisive document, since it was issued by the King of England,
who was clearly authorized to make such a policy statement on
behalf of the England he ruled. While that point may seem self-evident,
more important is its corollary, i.e., that, once proclaimed,
the Proclamation would remain the official policy of the Crown
until it was rescinded or changed by some other duly authorized
authority. Clark argues this has never happened in Canada;4 the
Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 left the policies enunciated
by the Proclamation as an encumbrance upon the Government of Canada.
Although the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal
government the exclusive responsibility for "matters regarding
Indians and Indian lands", this is in the nature of a fiduciary
trust.
From the perspective of the Royal Proclamation, the
First Nations are recognized as sovereign authorities in those
lands which are reserved from the influence of the federal government.
But the new federal government imposed progressively greater legislative
authority over Indians. The position of the federal government
was an adversarial one. Their arguments held that the federal
government alone had sovereign authority over the land mass known
as Canada; there were no such things as "aboriginal rights";
and, if there were, then it was within the power of the Government
of Canada to extinguish them, and they had done so a long time
ago.
At their worst, the courts have been referred to as "handmaidens
of government", particularly in their not having adequately
questioned "the myth" of absolute federal sovereignty.
Boldt & Long (1985a), for example, assert that
"The Canadian courts, like those of New Zealand, Australia,
and the United States, act as handmaidens of the government, consistently
giving precedence to the legitimacy and validity of government
power, policies, and actions at the expense of basic principles
of tort, restitution, contract, and property on which the western
legal tradition stands. The courts made aboriginal rights subject
to the self-interest of the dominant group; they subordinated
fundamental principles of justice and human rights to the collective
self-interest; and they legitimized the dominant group's use of
political and legislative power to deprive the aboriginal peoples
of their rights and self-government" (p.183).
J.Y. Henderson (1985) is similarly disapproving. He notes
that although the British seem to have generated honourable agreements
at a distance, relations in which their colonial representatives
were involved were guided by a combination of pragmatism and settler
greed. Instead of upholding the rule of law, Henderson argues
the courts became the instrument through which injustice was perpetrated,
and rationalized. He goes on to suggest that
"The history of aboriginal rights and treaties in the
British Empire illustrates that authoritative legal documents
have never been sufficient to overcome institutional racism"
(p.215).
Perhaps serving as an apologist for the apologists, W.B. Henderson
(1985) notes the positivist quality of Canadian jurisprudence,
and describes the manner in which this constrained their decisions:
"The judges in this country will look to see if they
can find an applicable law and, regardless of their feelings about
the merits of that law, will apply it. In numerous native law
cases -- some dealing with aboriginal rights, others with treaty
rights -- judges have said at some length that though the applicable
law is totally immoral and unfair, the law is the law and they
have no choice but to apply it." (p.223).
Notwithstanding the negative evaluations by Boldt & Long
(1985a) and J.Y. Henderson (1985), it is also true that the Courts,
and especially the Supreme Court, have clearly had a positive
effect on the course of aboriginal-governmental relations. Two
of the most significant events in that arena were (1) Calder
v Attorney General of British Columbia (1973); and (2) Court
decisions following implementation of the Constitution Act,
1982, involving interpretation of sec 35(1), which notes that
"...the existing rights of aboriginal people are hereby recognized
and affirmed..."
Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia was brought
forth by Frank Calder, of the Nisga'a First Nation of British
Columbia, who sought court recognition that aboriginal title to
the Nass valley had never been extinguished. The British Columbia
government had argued that (a) there was no such thing as aboriginal
title; or (b) if there was such a thing, it was extinguished long
ago. The B.C. Supreme Court had supported the province's assertions,
but the matter had been appealed to the Supreme Court.
Seven judges of the Supreme Court heard the appeal, and one
of the Justices decided against the Nisga'a on purely procedural
grounds.5 Of the remaining six, all agreed there had indeed been
such a thing as "Indian title", but were divided 3-3
on the question of whether that title still existed, or had been
extinguished. Three felt that extinguishment had to be done explicitly,
and noted that the B.C. government had never done so, ergo Indian
title to the Nass Valley must still exist. The other three felt
that extinguishment could be done implicitly, and ruled that the
government had done so when it showed actions consistent with
the idea that extinguishment had occurred (e.g., by giving European
settlers permission to settle in a location, even though a treaty
with the relevant First Nation(s) had not yet been signed. As
Tennant (1990) describes it,
"In practical terms the Nisga'a appeal thus failed. ...
Still, the fact that three members of Canada's highest court viewed
Nisga'a title as still in existence was a major turn of events
(and one which soon led the federal government to agree to negotiate
where title had not been explicitly extinguished). The province
had clearly lost the legal argument over pre-existing title and
had almost lost on the issue of continuing title. It now had good
reason to fear future court decisions." (p.221)
Tennant (1990) is not the only one to ascribe such significance
to the Nisga'a "loss" in Calder. Weaver (1981)
noted that the decision "...significantly influenced Trudeau's
own thinking, leading him to believe there was greater legitimacy
to Indian title than he had thought in 1969." (p.198), and
she notes also the subsequent emergence of a new federal policy
regarding comprehensive claim settlements. Though Yukon aboriginal
leader Peter Ittinuar (1985) expressed skepticism about the courts
as a route to resolution of rights claims, he, too, recognized
the positive impact of Calder:
"Prior to the Calder decision, the federal government
felt it could deal with outstanding native claims in the North
at its own discretion because our claims had no sound legal basis.
The decision in the Calder case gave our claims a much
greater legal validity and prompted the government to enter into
a process of meaningful formal negotiations" (pp.49-50).
Subsequent litigation at the Supreme Court pecked away at
the adversarial wall which the federal government had erected
over the concept of aboriginal rights. The biggest transition,
however, had its advent with the Constitution Act, 1982.
As Lyon (1992) describes,
"Before 1982, we had a written constitution, but we did
not have the legal mindset that goes with constitutionalism. The
Canadian legal profession hung tenaciously to a model of constitutional
law built on the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and the
values of the common law served by default as the shared values
of Canadian society." (p.306).
It was their failure to question parliamentary supremacy that
undermined the integrity of the Canadian judiciary in the eyes
of critics like J.Y. Henderson (1985) and Boldt and Long (1985a).
The problem is that, with respect to aboriginal peoples, it was
all based on a selective recollection of history. Lyon (1992)
cites Gunnar Myrdal's 1967 Wimmer Lecture to the effect that "...we
guard our ignorance about aboriginal peoples and of their treatment
by Euro-Canadians in order to protect our belief that they neither
deserve nor can handle the right of self-determination that we
take for granted for ourselves." (p.307). Thus, as Lyon argues,
as long as we could continue guarding the lie through a self-referential
and self-serving common law that treated parliament as supreme,
then all remained intact. But the Constitution Act, 1982
created a different reality; the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
offers a higher authority than Parliament, and Section 35(1) adds
that "the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
Of those Supreme Court decisions which have been rendered
since 1982, Lyon (1992), Macklem (1992), and Wildsmith (1992)
all see the decision in Sparrow v Regina (1986) as having
given strong indications about what that reality will involve.
Tennant (1990) explains: "The case arose when Ronald Sparrow,
a Musqueum, was charged with contravening federal regulations
while fishing in the Lower Fraser River. The location was not
part of a reserve, nor did any treaty apply." (p.225). Macklem
(1992) draws its implications for aboriginal rights issues in
the following manner:
"At issue was whether the Musqueum nation ... could assert
an Aboriginal right to fish that would override federal regulations...
The Musqueum asserted that their right to fish was an 'existing'
Aboriginal right, 'recognized and affirmed' by s.35(1) of the
Constitution Act, and therefore paramount over federal
law that regulated its exercise." (p.283).
The Supreme Court ruled in their favour. The court's reasoning
was that "...although Canada enjoys sovereignty over its
indigenous population,..." (Macklem, 1992, p.283), fishing
is demonstrably "aboriginal", and a part of "existing"
aboriginal rights that are now guaranteed by the Constitution.
More importantly, the Court ruled that the existence of federal
legislation is irrelevant:
"... the Court in Sparrow held that s.35(1) Aboriginal
rights are not contingent upon the exercise of legislative or
executive authority. In the Court's view, the reason for concluding
that the Musqueum nation enjoys a right to fish lies not in the
presence of state action conferring such a right onto the Musqueum
people but instead because fishing is integral to Musqueum self-identity
and self-preservation" (pp.283-284).
The important point here is that
"The content of Aboriginal rights thus is to be determined
not by reference to whether executive or legislative action conferred
such a right on the people in question, but rather by reference
to that which is essential to or inherent in the unique relations
that Aboriginal peoples have with nature and each other."
(p.284).
Lyon (1992) explains the decision in Sparrow, later
reaffirmed in a case involving Sioui, as an elaboration
of the federal government's fiduciary responsibilities with respect
to natives:
"The language of both judgements makes it clear that
if the Supreme Court were an international tribunal it would have
required the Crown to honour its committments." (p.308).
As for the nature of these committments,
"Before Sparrow, it was possible to define the
Crown's special relationship simply in terms of the right to go
on the land to hunt and fish. Now we have both Sparrow
and Sioui to tell us that our understanding of aboriginal
rights has been built on a misreading of history and a persistent
failure of governments to honour their committments. The government's
duty is to protect a way of life, not just certain activities."
(pp.310-311).
Whether decisions of this sort will continue to be made in
favour of aboriginal participants in Court actions, is another
issue. Most recently -- in a decision which came after
both the Sparrow and Sioui cases cited above --
Chief Justice Allan McEachern of the B.C. Supreme Court decided
against the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en [plaintiffs in Delgamuukw
v the Queen (1991)] in their joint effort to assert aboriginal
title to their homelands in British Columbia. The decision was
disappointing to the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en and their supporters
for many reasons (see Cassidy, 1992a), not the least of which
was an apparently intentional historical myopia shown by the Chief
Justice, and the insult of his refusing to consider oral history
evidence which the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en had chosen, only with
great trepidation, to share in public court for the first time
(see Monet & Skanu'u, 1992).
As Fisher (1992) describes, it was ominous that the judge
would take one of the "standard" Eurocentric histories
(Woodcock, 1990) as his launching point. In keeping with the general
tenor of that history, MacEachern believed that the aboriginals
were a fallen people with little to offer. In contrast to their
oral history, which he saw as a "romanticized" view
of their past, MacEachern made reference to the pre-contact life
of the aboriginals as having been little more than "nasty,
brutish, and short". The Chief Justice, whose 400 page decision
shared at least two of those attributes, added further insult
to injury by opining that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en ancestors of
the plaintiffs had "roamed" on their lands for thousands
of years on little more than "survival instincts", and
that, although they might have had "folkways" or "customs",
there was no way indigenous peoples had anything which might "properly"
be termed "law".6
Quite in contrast to contemporary standards of civility, if
not law (e.g., see Clark, 1990; Foster, 1992; Kellock & Anderson,
1992), the judgement in Delgamuukw v the Queen suggests
that Indian title to British Columbia could be extinguished implicitly,
if, in the judgement of the court, the provincial government had
acted in a manner which showed in some "clear and plain"
manner that the province was acting to extinguish aboriginal title
(e.g., see Burns, 1992). The judge could point to no particular
action in this regard, but inferred that extinguishment had occured
by virtue of the provincial government acting as if it had. It
is interesting that he notes often the behaviour of then Surveyor-General
Joseph Trutch, who is typically portrayed in historical research
as a governmental robber baron who seemed to believe that if one
ignored the Indians for long enough, they and the problems associated
with them would all go away (e.g., see Fisher, 1992; Tennant,
1990).7 Ironically, acceptance of the MacEachern judgement would
make him correct.
One wonders how Indians might have expressed their objections
to the action at the time, since it had no clear temporal onset.
It may also be recalled that this was the period when objection
would have been further obstructed by the use of the new Indian
Act to undermine Indian citizenship and traditional forms
of Indian government, to constrain dissent by making it illegal
for Indians to leave their reserve (without the Indian Agent's
permission) to discuss matters of common interest with other Indians,
and to deny access to the courts by making it illegal for Indians
to hire a lawyer, or raise money to attempt to hire a lawyer,
in order to pursue land claims.
All things considered, Chief Justice MacEachern's judgement
seems a regrettably classic example of the court serving as "the
handmaiden of government" (e.g., recall Boldt & Long,
1985a; J.Y. Henderson, 1985). Given supportive contemporary attitudes
regarding aboriginal issues among the public, and a Supreme Court
that has shown an openness to assertions of aboriginal rights
following the advent of the Constitution Act, 1982, the
Delgamuukw judgement seemed totally out of place, having
more in common with judgements from the latter 19th century than
with the contemporary courts. Had this been because of some consistent
allegiance to legal memorabilia, one might understand, but the
Chief Justice's eschewing of the applicability of the Royal
Proclamation showed that his historical choices were selective
rather than uniform. On the other hand, there were also many observers
who were highly critical of the judgement, which they viewed as
disparaging, condescending, paternalistic, and self-righteous
(e.g., see an array of commentary in Cassidy, 1992a). One assumes
the case will eventually work its way to the Supreme Court.
By way of general summary, it can be seen that the Courts,
and especially the Supreme Court, have, for the most part, rendered
decisions which have been encouraging to aboriginal peoples. Their
decisions have been associated with termination of government
inertia regarding claim negotiation, have shown many of the government's
adversarial assertions to be combative, frivolous, and occasionally
in questionable taste, and have shown many of the aboriginal assertions
to have considerable merit. Perhaps the Court's greatest contribution,
however, has been the way their decisions have greatly increased
aboriginal leverage in negotiation by documenting the strength
of their position.
All things considered, however, it seems most of those involved
would prefer to avoid the Courts, due to their many disadvantages:
(1) costliness in terms of human and financial resources; (2)
the adversarial and hence often acrimonious nature of proceedings,
which is hardly the type of relationship one would hope to have
between government and aboriginal leaders; (3) unpredictable outcomes
which are usually at one extreme or the other, rather than a mediated
solution which is agreeable to both parties and potentially more
flexible in the nature of arrangements to be derived; and (4)
they are run by the Euro-Canadian government which, from the aboriginal
perspective, is a foreign system, in a foreign language, under
somebody else's control.
The International Forum
There are many ways in which Canadian aboriginal leaders are
connected to the international arena, three of which are of particular
interest in the present context: (1) the unique relation which
exists between Canadian First Nations leaders and the English
Monarchy; (2) participation in the international aboriginal community;
and (3) United Nations working groups and committees dealing with
aboriginal issues.
Douglas Sanders (1985) notes that supranational strategies
typically are not available to minority groups, since questions
about minority rights are generally considered "domestic"
issues. Nonetheless, natives have found this avenue open to them
for a variety of reasons; e.g., as Sanders cites, they were an
indigenous sovereign culture who were victims of colonialism;
their Canadian history includes various direct links with the
British Monarchy; and they have a very positive image as the "noble
red savage" (however bittersweet that may be) thanks to much
romantic literature and art.
The connection with the Crown is stronger in many ways among
Natives than it is for most other Canadians. Sanders (1985) notes
that most Natives heard from early colonizers about the "Great
White Mother" who lived across the sea, and he suggests they
believed the talk about British integrity and fairness, particularly
with respect to the nation-to-nation status of their relations.
Aboriginals fought with the Crown in the war for North America,
and were rewarded in part by the Royal Proclamation which
was direct from the king, and assured their future under British
rule. On various occasions, aboriginal leaders have made direct
representations to the Monarch (and were received); many British
dignitaries (e.g., Prince of Wales, several Governors General)
were made honourary chiefs; and many Royal Visits to Canada have
intentionally included trips to particular Native lands.
It should also be noted that natives' faith in the integrity
of the Monarchy had often been rewarded -- Britain (generally
through the Privy Council) intervened on the Indians' behalf on
many occasions when the white colonists (and their governments)
were getting a bit too carried away. The problem was that justice
from a distant, neutral body became tainted with self-interest
when the judgements, involving local interests and local priorities,
started to be made by a white judiciary with allegiances to the
local (white) order. As J.Y. Henderson (1985) describes it,
"Anglo-American decisions on aboriginal rights share
three main themes. First, there is legal acceptance of the doctrine
of aboriginal rights and treaties existing in the law of nature
and nations, with contractual principles ordering the jurisdiction
of European nations and the American nations. Second, the law
recognizes the necessity of uniting American nations in a political
commonwealth by international treaties of protection, so that
they can be protected by the ultimate sovereign against his subjects
and other sovereigns. The third theme, the dark theme, is that
once within the colonizer's legal system, each protecting government
is mystically given by its courts the unlimited power to extinguish
Indian treaty and aboriginal rights for the good of the rest of
society." (p.220).
So while they should have been the guardians of the highest
principles, the model of our alleged "civility", instead
"The courts became caretakers of the racism of the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries." ... "In its approach
to the rights of native peoples the law becomes tyranny at worst
and an ineffective apologist at best. The Canadian government
may call it law, but it is racism. It is not founded on the principles
that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."
(J.Y. Henderson, 1985, p.220).
Constraints on the international personality of aboriginal
peoples were manifest particularly after 1867, whence the federal
government often went out of its way to thwart Indian-regal communication,
both to assert its own sense of sovereign authority, and to avoid
international embarassment (Sanders, 1985). Still, aboriginal
leaders have often made effective use of these links; the success
of their efforts to block the patriation of the 1982 Constitution
(and thereby gain concessions regarding recognition of aboriginal
rights) is a recent example in this regard.
Perhaps it is not surprising to learn that growth in Indian
organizations in Canada has been paralleled by similar developments
among indigenous peoples in other countries. Sanders (1985) identifies
some of the growing number of international aboriginal organizations
through which indigenous peoples have found a broader voice, including
five bodies which have non-governmental organization (NGO) status
at the United Nations: the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,
the International Indian Treaty Council, the Indian Law Resource
Centre, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and the Four Directions
Council.
Although, as Sanders (1985) suggests, "It is common wisdom
that the queen and the United Nations are powerless" (p.302),
the articulation of positions on the international stage "...serves
both the short-term goal of applying pressure on the nation-state
and the long term goal of developing international standards"
(pp.302-303). In that sense, one can see that involvement at the
international level has varied benefits -- one gains a platform
to vocalize shared concerns, and one also reaffirms that one is
indeed a "nation" with "an international character".
As Sanders (1985) describes, "Indigenous populations persist
in the belief that their rights are not simply a matter for domestic
law." (p.303), and their involvement in international forums
is testimony to that effect.
Aboriginal involvement at the United Nations has had two main
foci in recent decades. Attention to aboriginal concerns can be
seen to some degree in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
ratified in 1948, though a limitation of the Universal Declaration
was that it envisioned "rights" only in individual and
not also in collective terms (e.g., see Boldt & Long, 1985b;
D.Sanders, 1991). This was rectified to some degree by two International
Covenants, which were passed in 1966, and declared the right of
all "peoples" to self-determination.
Of the two Covenants, one hears most often about The First
Protocol to the International Convention for Civil and Political
Rights. It states that "all people have the right to self-determination",
and that states who sign the covenant "shall promote the
realisation of the rights of self-determination, and shall respect
that right,..." (Craigie, 1992, p.17). Canada's responsibilities
under that Covenant had been acknowledged and discussed in the
Report of the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government in Canada
(1983; the Penner Report; cited in Sanders, 1985):
"Canada is obliged to protect and promote the rights
of the peoples of the Indian First Nations in a manner consistent
with the rights guaranteed in the international covenants Canada
has signed -- the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. These agreements guarantee
both the fundamental collective rights of peoples to be self-governing
and the basic human rights of individuals." (at 136 of Penner
report; quoted in Sanders, 1985, p.386).
It is the terms of the Covenant which Canadian aboriginal
groups are interested in having the federal government recognize
in practice. But the Canadian position has been an extremely cautious
one, much to the chagrin of aboriginal representatives. Coon-Come
(1991) and Ronnenberg (1991) both commented on the federal government's
obstructiveness at the United Nations, noting that Canada has
sought to avoid its obligations by arguing that aboriginals in
Canada are not "peoples" in the sense of the International
Covenant. Joe Sanders (1991) describes the issues thusly:
"In international law, the concept of self-determination
encompasses the right of peoples 'freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development'. A people has been
authoritatively described by the World Court as 'a group of persons
living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion,language and tradition in sentiment of solidarity, with a view
to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship,
ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance
with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual
assistance to each other'. A people identifies itself as such
provided the criteria are met. It requires no imagination to realize
that Indians are distinct peoples within Canada." (p.191).
Douglas Sanders (1992a) explains Canada's international reluctance
in part by noting that the government is loathe to agree to wording
which may come back to haunt it in other contexts. This is particularly
so because of resemblances on positions with respect to collective
rights, which have been put forth both by aboriginal leaders,
as well as by francophones in Quebec. In this regard, Sanders
reports that Canada's input was to ensure that, in the Declaration
on Indigenous Peoples which is now being drafted and discussed,
references to "aboriginal rights of self-determination"
have added the phrase "within the states in which
they find themselves".
One can understand that the Government of Canada is wont to
consider the impact of aboriginal matters on other areas in which
they have responsibility. On the other hand, Canada's representatives
also have been accused of obstructiveness on matters which would
seem to have limited precedent value in other domains. Bellegarde
(1991), for example, accuses the federal government of being obstructive
toward United Nations' research into treaties and other forms
of agreements. Sanders (1992b) would seem to agree, suggesting
that government reluctance in that instance may have been due,
at least in part, to worries about becoming a target in the final
Report. In any event, Canada's objections slowed the study by
two years, and produced two changes in the study's mandate: (1)
that the study would be worldwide in scope, and not focus exclusively
on Canada or North America; and (2) that the study would be oriented
to the future rather than to past treaties, and would be broadened
to include not only treaties per se, but also agreements and "other
constructive arrangements" (Sanders, 1992b). The study is
now in progress, under the direction of Miguel Alfonso Martinez
of Cuba as "special rapporteur", who is also a member
of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, and its bureaucratic
parent, the Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities.
The future will likely see Canada's aboriginal leaders engaging
in international and supranational activities with equal or greater
frequency. As has been the case in the domestic courts, involvement
at the international level has brought limited, though significant
success, suggesting that international forums will be only one
of an array of ventures and collaborations in which Canadian aboriginals
continue to be engaged. Their international presence in itself
reminds us that aboriginals are not "just another" minority
group, but one with an international personality; and any gains
in the international forum, create positive ripples domestically.
As Sanders (1985) notes:
"Well-meaning advisers have in the past often tried to
steer them away from petitions to the crown or appeals at the
international level. But the expert's vision of what is possible
has proved faulty. Only by ignoring advice and persisting in their
beliefs have indigenous peoples initiated changes in the Canadian
constitution and in international law." (p.303).
The Future of Aboriginal-Government Relations
Primary researchers who have studied aboriginal-governmental
relations note that the First Nations of Canada have been asserting
the need to talk about land claims and aboriginal self-government
for well over a century (e.g., see Fisher, 1992; Fisher &
Coates, 1988; Tennant, 1990). It is the federal and provincial
governments who have been the reluctant negotiators, having made
the decision some years ago to argue from the position that (a)
the lifestyles of the aboriginals did not constitute "occupancy"
of the continent; (b) that international rights of discovery (as
formulated by the European discoverers) gave them rights of colonization;
and (c) that any rights the aboriginals might have, existed solely
at the pleasure of the new federal government. Although the internal
consistency of these positions made the argument impervious for
many years when judged according to the canons of positivist law,
the moral bankruptcy and historical distortion required for their
imposition seems to have run out of favour.
One fundamental issue continues to leave something of a "policy
cleavage", to use the quaint terminology of Romanow (1985),
between native and governmental perspectives. The issue is whether
aboriginal self-government is an inherent right, or exists only
at the pleasure of, and hence is "given" by, the federal
government. Its manifestations have been blatantly evident in
the context of negotiations regarding self-government arrangements.
Examples are well-documented in proceedings of symposia such as
Cassidy (1991a), where aboriginal leaders like Watts (1991b),
Harper (1991) and Georges Erasmus (1991), joust verbally with
government representatives such as then-Minister of Indian Affairs
Tom Siddon (1991), DIAND Director General George Da Pont (1991),
and Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General Tait
(1991). The federal government seems to seek affirmation of its
legitimacy as the controller of native destiny. In contrast, aboriginal
leaders seek affirmation of their foundational role as the indigenous
peoples of this continent, some indication of appreciation for
their willingness to share and contribute to the development of
the continent, and recognition of their continuing and inherent
right of self-determination.
It would be incorrect to write off these differences as mere
terminological quibbles, even though both positions lead in the
short term along the same path, i.e., to greater allowances for
and exercise of self-determinative and self-determined strategies
among aboriginal First Nations and their peoples. At issue are
fundamental differences on the key question of who has the final
say when it comes to the directions, and degree of change, that
are "acceptable" (e.g., see Boldt & Long, 1985a;
Cassidy, 1991c). Governments point to policies of 'devolution'
of federal powers, and assert that all changes in the 1990s are
initiated by natives themselves. Natives, on the other hand, point
out that it is still governmental ears which listen to the proposals,
and governmental hands which control the purse strings, and that
their hearing can be remarkably impaired or acute, and their responses
very agile or slow, depending on whether Indians "speak"
to governments in terms that are meaningful to them, and in accordance
with their own budgets and priorities.
While political leaders seek resolution of apparent impasses
on the "big" issues such as that noted above, Dobell,
in his foreward to Cassidy and Bish (1989), argues that ambiguity
at that level need not necessarily preclude continuing development
of programmes and structures at a day-to-day level. Indeed, Cassidy
and Bish (1989) is a revelation of the myriad ways that "Indian
self-government" is constructed and reconstructed on a daily
basis. But my interest here is not in reiterating the contents
of that volume, which looks at self-government in a broad sense,
but rather, to look at the nature of aboriginal-government relations
and negotiations in the particular microcosm of criminal justice.
Aboriginal Justice
Tensions that are being played out in the justice area parallel
those in the broader domain of aboriginal-governmental relations.
The need for change is abundantly obvious, with the relationship
between aboriginal peoples and the Canadian justice system having
been described by some as Canada's national disgrace (e.g., see
McCaskill, 1983). The over-representation of natives in Canada's
jails and prisons has been well-documented (e.g., see Jackson,
1988; McCaskill, 1983; Zimmerman, 1992), and putting the basis
for this over-representation solely at the foot of greater aboriginal
criminality has become increasingly untenable.
Academics and an array of Commissions have been unanimous
in recognizing and lamenting practices which are to the detriment
of aboriginal peoples at every level of the criminal justice system
(e.g., Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991; Law Reform Commission, 1991;
Task Force on the Criminal Justice System, 1991; Zimmerman, 1992).
Indeed, it seems clear that natives are discriminated against
at virtually every moment of the criminal justice process -- they
are "over-policed" compared to non-natives; are placed
under greater surveillance; are more likely to be arrested than
whites given identical circumstances; are less likely to have
adequate legal representation; are less likely to understand court
procedures (for both linguistic and broader cultural reasons);
are more likely to plead guilty; are less likely to be granted
bail; are more likely to be given incarcerative sentences; and
are less likely to receive probation and parole than non-natives
with similar offence histories. (e.g., Law Reform Commission,
1991; Sawatsky, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). The general picture is
one of institutionalized racism, i.e., where aboriginal peoples
are systematically disadvantaged whenever they are placed in the
crucible of contemporary Canadian criminal justice.
Although the magnitude of the problem is by now well known,
the question of what to do remains. In that regard, an array of
Royal Commissions, provincial Boards of Inquiry, and myriad policy
articles have offered advice which can be conceived as falling
into a continuum of possibilities which, at their extremes, promote
accomodation, or autonomy.
Accomodative Strategies in Aboriginal Justice
The notion of accomodation reflects the belief that,
while there are many reasons to believe that the Canadian criminal
justice system must change in its relations with aboriginals,
our current system of justice is sufficiently understanding, flexible,
and compassionate to accomodate to aboriginals and their needs.
And although the phrase "accomodative strategies" suggests
a homogeneous category, it is probably best to envision a continuum
of possibilities, each of which involves some degree of deflection
away from status quo Euro-Canadian justice, albeit united
by the belief that the status quo should remain the standard,
the question being one of how much one is allowed to deviate.
Indigenization
Those who have worried about the "impracticalities"
of making wholesale changes to aboriginal-governmental relations
in the justice area have suggested that, as a minimum, efforts
could be made to involve more persons of aboriginal heritage in
the criminal justice system. The Task Force on the Criminal Justice
System (1991), for example, stated
"It is our position that numerous changes can be made
relatively quickly to the existing criminal justice system to
make it more sensitive to the needs of Aboriginal people. The
first step in this process is the "indigenization" of
the criminal justice system.... [which] can, in fact, go a long
way toward meeting the wishes of some Aboriginal people."
(p.1-7).
By "indigenization", the Task Force meant an effort
to ensure that native accused understand the legal processes that
involve them, and, especially, representation by aboriginals at
all levels of the criminal justice planning and programme delivery
process, e.g., more native police officers for better understanding
and community liaison; more translators to ensure that accused
understand what is going on in court; more native courtworkers
to explain proceedings to the accused; and an effort to secure
more aboriginal judges, perhaps as justices of the peace, with
limited jurisdiction, in the lower courts (see Siddon, 1991).
"We believe that to achieve harmony between the justice
system and the Aboriginal people, they must be fully involved
in any policy development, program planning and implementation
and service delivery with respect to the criminal justice system."
(Task Force, 1991, p.1-1).
Others have agreed that aboriginals are highly under-represented
among criminal justice practitioners, and that "indigenization",
as an interim measure, would redress a glaring and unacceptable
situation (e.g., Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991; Law Reform Commission,
1991).
Understanding Indian Reality
Although similar in many respects, Ross (1992) has taken the
matter a step further by calling not only for moves which will
help Indians understand the justice system, but also in suggesting
that the justice system could do a lot better job of understanding
natives. Ross is a Crown Attorney with the Northern Ontario circuit
court, and his book, which is aptly subtitled "Exploring
Indian Reality", emerged from his efforts "... to articulate
[his] confusion at the actions, reaction and explanations of Native
victims and witnesses in the court process." (p.xvii). Based
on his own observation, and aided by discussion with aboriginal
leaders and criminal justice practitioners, Ross induces a set
of principles, or "ethics", which offer greater understanding
of the Ojibway and Cree peoples with whom he comes in contact.
Through it, we also begin to see how many of their cultural tenets
leave aboriginal peoples systematically disadvantaged in the courts.
Two of these desiderata, for example, are the "ethic
of non-interference", and "the ethic that anger not
be shown". The first expresses the principle that aboriginals
(or at least those on Ross's court circuit) should never interfere
in another person's life, no matter what the consequences, while
the second affirms that anger should never be directed overtly
toward another person. Just these two can be seen to make elements
of the court problematic, since the requirement to give evidence
can be seen as interference in the affairs of others, while victim
impact testimony, to the extent that it is solicited at all, would
(by the second ethic) in all likelihood be seen as unconvincing
because of the flat tone in which it was offered. Mannette (1992b)
offers a similar example regarding the Mi'kmaq. She notes that
in the Mi'kmaq culture, emotionality is not reflected by overt
emotional tone such as the raising of the voice, but in the language
chosen, with the result that Mi'kmaq are not seen as "good
witnesses" because of what is perceived as their "passive"
demeanour and flat tone.
Ross also notes a corollary ethic involving truth-telling
among many aboriginal groups. For many First Nations, where oral
history is valued and responsibility for one's actions paramount,
telling a lie can be seen as a horrid crime. Ross notes that this
is the case among the Mohawks, where a reputation for lying follows
one forever, and where, for one's third 'conviction' for lying
-- which included such actions as attempting to deny or minimize
one's behaviour -- the consequence was banishment. Ross (1992)
continues:
"Among all Native groups with whom I have worked there
appears to be nothing akin to our 'right to silence', our right
to refuse to incriminate ourselves. On the contrary, there appears
to be an opposite commandment, one that requires full disclosure,
full acknowledgement of wrongs. ... It may be that this ethic
contributes substantially to the high frequency of guilty pleas
by native accused. At the very least, it contributes to a high
rate of full confessions during police questioning, and these
confessions are often what lead defence counsel to the conclusion
that a plea of 'not guilty' would be fruitless." (p.13).
Ross acknowledges that the principles he has unearthed may
not generalize beyond the Ojibway and Cree with whom he interacts,
or, if they do, may not extend beyond other tribes with hunter-gatherer
traditions, especially to those who are more localized, hierarchical,
and/or resource rich. Nonetheless, he offers his insights as a
first step to finding some mutual accomodation involving aboriginals
and the courts, and implores those who are in the system to take
steps to enhance their understanding of the aboriginal cultures
with whom they deal (see also Denny, 1992, on this point).
Sentencing Circles
Having taken some of those steps, Yukon Territorial Court
Judge Barry Stuart took the matter a step further in his decision
in Philip Moses v The Queen (1992). No doubt anticipating
the interest that might be taken in his actions by the broader
justice community, Stuart begins his judgement with the statement
that "The reasons for this sentence will take us on an unusual
journey." (p.1). The charges in the case arose from Philip
Moses having taken a baseball bat and attempting to assault an
RCMP constable. There were also charges for theft (stealing clothes
from a home), and breach of probation. Although only 26 years
old, Moses had been in trouble with the law before; his prior
criminal record included 43 convictions, and his time in juvenile
facilities and jail had totalled 8 years. His most recent prior
conviction had been three years previous, when he had been sentenced
to 15 months. Notwithstanding his native status and horrific background
(victim of physical and sexual abuse, poor education, alcohol
and substance abuse), it looked like the sentencing hearing following
his guilty plea would be a short one, with the only question being
how much longer than 15 months he should be sent away for this
time. But the court took a detour; Stuart's (1992) reasons for
judgement document the procedures he followed and the reasons
for doing so.
The report is, first of all, a litany of the myriad ways in
which the justice system has been ineffective in doing anything
positive with Moses, and, instead, seems only to have exacerbated
his problems. Stuart noted that the justice system had probably
spent about a quarter of a million dollars on Philip Moses thus
far, and that it appeared they had succeeded in little more than
making him even more dangerous and destructive. Stuart was determined
to find another route.
His first step was to change the physical layout of the courtroom,
in the hopes of making the setting less intimidating and judge-centered.
The design chosen was a circle, with everyone (including Moses)
an 'equal' participant in the discussion about how to best meet
the challenge. Stuart began by declaring an upper limit to the
sentence; nothing that anyone said could be used to make a more
severe sentence for Moses. And then the sentencing hearing began.
His description gives one the impression that it was 'community
involvement' at its best, with the Na-cho Ny'ak Dun First Nation
Chief and Philip Moses's parents being among the active participants
in the sentencing hearing (plus many others).
In the end, the sentence was suspended, and Moses was put
on probation for two years, with a variety of conditions imposed
that had been agreed upon by all the participants, including Moses.
The general atmosphere was one in which the grounds for reconciliation
among Moses, his family, and his community had been achieved,
and one is left with the impression that Moses may well have felt
like he belonged and was wanted for the first time in a long time.
From this point on, his responsibility is to the circle, with
which he will meet at certain defined points in the future. The
general tone is certainly one of optimism, particularly since
Moses is serving a sentence which he himself took a part in constructing.
Though we don't know yet how the Moses case will "turn
out", in a sense it is immaterial. Certainly the court could
do no worse for Philip Moses and his community than had been done
in the years up to the Stuart (1992) sentence, and one could argue
that the important point here was not whether the sentence itself
was the "right" one, but that the process by which it
was generated was a "proper" one, i.e., with involvement
by the community; a joint sitting in which the wishes of the community,
and particularly of the elders, was considered and respected;
and, committment by the community and the offender to a plan of
action. My understanding is that Stuart is now using sentencing
circles whenever aboriginal accused are involved, and that one
of his colleagues on the Yukon territorial court has joined him
in this practice.
The South Island Project
An even more elaborate extension of perhaps the same logic
is evident in a project now underway in British Columbia, involving
the Nuu-chah-nulth (South Island) Tribal Council, and the provincial
court, of Vancouver Island. Tennant (1992a) gives us some contextual
background of the Island Salish, who are the major participants
in the project, by noting that their traditional structure "...rested
on numerous extended families, each headed by a "S'ul Hwen""
(p.4).8 Notwithstanding their historical importance, the role
and status of the S'ul Hwen was seriously undermined by the Indian
Act and all its prohibitions. Tennant describes how justice
among the Salish, as is the case with many other First Nations,
is not separate from other aspects of life; the approach is a
holistic one, with the emphasis on healing and reconciliation
rather than punishment. The central ceremonial spot in the Coast
Salish culture is the Bighouse, and it is here where teaching,
councils, and healing would occur.
The project started with a number of educational workshops
organized by Provincial Court Judge Douglas Campbell through the
Western Judicial Education Centre. Initially the workshops were
primarily for judges, but soon grew to involve many different
aboriginal and criminal justice practitioners. Soon, the South
Island justice project was organized, and a "Council of the
S'ul Hwen" was formed, who would receive referrals from families,
police, crown, and/or the courts. Essentially, the project involved
creating a "diversion" scheme where (a) if a case met
criteria specified by the S'ul Hwen as being within their domain
of expertise and interest; and (b) it was agreeable to victim
and perpetrator to go through the alternative system, they went
for it. There were many types of cases the S'ul Hwen decided they
would avoid, at least for now, both because of a paucity of resources
(i.e., only so many elders), and perhaps also to foster early
success and enhance confidence. Tennant reports that a major part
of the process involved the building of mutual credibility and
trust between the aboriginal and criminal justice participants.
It was decided that any aboriginal accused could participate,
whether Island Salish or not, and whether a resident of a reserve
or not; if the person was aboriginal and willing, they would be
considered if the other criteria were also met. As for initial
exclusions, the S'ul Hwen did not want older recidivist candidates
(i.e., start younger), and did not want to get into major or violent
crimes, including sexual assault and impaired driving (though
some of the examples Tennant gives included stabbings). Most of
the cases involved "theft under" and assaults.
At this point, all that can be said is "so far so good",
with all immediate participants in the project feeling that the
initiative has been positive and beneficial. More detailed assessments,
including those which address the broader community's support
and/or involvement, have not yet been undertaken. From what has
been observed thus far, the project is certainly successful to
the extent that (a) it has fostered positive links between the
criminal justice system and the natives, and produced an outgrowth
of communication and mutual respect; and (b) it is consistent
with greater aboriginal self-determination. In that broader context,
the most recent indications (from Tennant, 1992a) are that the
Island Salish are pleased to the extent that the general attitude
of participants in the project see the Elders Council "in
partnership" with the existing system, on a "separate
and equal" basis.
Aboriginal Courts
The final alternative to be reviewed here involves establishing
Native or Aboriginal Courts, which, in some ways, represents the
most autonomous among the accomodative strategies. There is actually
some experience with this alternative to date in other countries
-- McCaskill (1983) notes that some aboriginal courts have existed
in the United States for more than a century, while Jackson (1992)
notes examples of Aboriginal courts in both America and Australia.
The idea of separate aboriginal courts may seem like more
of an "autonomous" rather than an "accomodative"
solution. Those included in this section of the paper, however,
include only those "aboriginal courts" which are essentially
indigenized Canadian courts, e.g., which utilize the Criminal
Code, engage in adversarial procedures, and adhere to sentencing
precedents established in the Provincial and Appeal Courts. To
that extent, some cynicism might be expressed about just how "aboriginal"
such courts might be. Though the reference in the following quote
is to the Australian aboriginal courts, Jackson's (1992) comments
might have equal applicability to the Canadian scene:
"There are general feelings of discontent among community
members participating in the scheme ... the whole social organization
of traditional Aboriginals rests on the kinship structure which
is closely linked to expectations and obligations between kin.
The Justice of the Peace scheme is creating havoc among tribal
Aboriginals in terms of the expectations alone. Tribal laws are
either being ignored or undermined by an alien value system. Further,
Aboriginal Justices feel they are becoming powerless both within
their own law, and within the framework of the...Act. ...
There is a lot of resentment and an increasing sense of impotency
because they feel they are still advisors to the court."
(p.227).
The experience with Aboriginal Courts in the United States
has been more extensive, and more positive. Hamilton and Sinclair
(1991) note that 145 American Indian tribes operated their own
courts, up from between 91 and 111 courts a decade before.9 These
numbers include the three types of Tribal Court systems that exist
in the United States today, i.e., (1) Traditional or Customary
Courts; (2) Courts of Indian Offenses; and (3) Tribal Courts.
The traditional courts are those which have continued to operate
by virtue of United States First Nations having been declared
"domestic dependent nations" by the American Supreme
Court in the 1820s, and in the absence of any federal legislation
to expressly remove them. Hamilton and Sinclair (1991) noted that
there were 14 of these traditional courts in operation when they
wrote, while Jackson (1992) adds that all of these exist among
the Pueblo Indians of the American south-west.
The Courts of Indian Offenses (CIOs) were first established
in 1883. Although the judges were all Indians, their appointments
were at the pleasure of the Indian Agent, and the civil and criminal
code they implemented was drafted by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991, p.273). As Jackson (1992)
describes them,
"Far from being an instrument of self-determination,
they were conceived as an adjunct to the process of cultural assimilation.
The establishment of these courts was part of the concerted effort
to outlaw traditional cultural institutions, eliminate plural
marriages, weaken the influence of the medicine men, promote law
and order, civilize the Indians and teach them respect for private
property by breaking up tribal land holdings into individual allotments.
... Customary law was ignored or outlawed as it represented a
way of life that the court was designed to destroy." (p.227).
Perhaps because of this, Hamilton and Sinclair (1991) report
that interest in CIOs had "declined dramatically" over
the years, with 23 in existence at the time of their writing.
On the other hand, the authors add that
"It is worth noting, however, that this structure still
is chosen sometimes as a starting point for a court system for
many tribes. For example, the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana chose
a Court of Indian Offenses in 1985 as their first effort at establishing
a tribal court." (p.275).
The most common type of tribal court in the United States
today are those Tribal Courts which were established under the
terms of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Hamilton
and Sinclair (1991) explain that
"Indian tribes were authorized by that legislation to
enact their own tribal constitutions and law and order codes,
under the supervision and ultimate control of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. ... A large number of tribes seized upon this opportunity
as a means to reduce the control of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
operating directly within their reservations and to restore a
greater degree of autonomy.
While the power of agents was reduced somewhat and Courts
of Indian Offenses were eliminated for those tribes which selected
this option, it also meant that those tribes had to choose to
function along the lines of American concepts of democracy and
governmental structures by relinquishing their traditional system.
... The tribal governments continued to retain their domestic,
dependent nationhood status over internal affairs, but their governmental
structure lost its traditional basis, and customary law was replaced
by Indian statutory enactments, known as 'tribal codes', as the
basis under which daily life was regulated." (pp.273-274).
Notwithstanding the obvious losses in traditional capacities
of control over justice and government, there has been a considerable
increase in the numbers of such courts over time -- Hamilton &
Sinclair (p.275) note that 58 were reported in one 1975 inventory,
compared with 108 a decade later.
The most well known of the tribal courts is that operated
by the Navajo of New Mexico; indeed, visiting the Navajo seems
to be something of a necessary pilgrammage for those who take
part in Commissions regarding aboriginal justice. The Navajo justice
system functions well, and is strongly supported by the tribe.
As Jackson (1992) opines, this may reflect the fact that
"...Indian tribes in the United States perceive the tribal
court as their court, an institution which is responsible
to them. As ... American Indian jurists pointed out, 'tribal members
have developed a respect for the tribal justice system because
whether the judges are elected or appointed the judges are ultimately
responsible to the tribe." (p.229).
Ironically, however, while the Navajo retain their status
as the Tribal Court sine qua non, they have also found
the Tribal Court as originally conceived to be overly constrained
in the range of alternatives it allows, and hence have expanded
to include more traditional options, such as Peacemaker Courts.
The fact that the tribal court system is open to such change is
certainly an element in its favour, and may account for its popularity
in comparison to the straight traditional courts, where the formidable
and sometimes impossible (not to mention constraining) pre-requisite
of re-creating one's "traditional" system leaves many
applicants frozen in the starting blocks.
The biggest limitation in the lessons that can be drawn from
the Navajo experience is its uniqueness -- the sheer magnitude
of their system yields economies of scale that are available to
no other First Nation, and the number of persons required to implement
the system would be beyond the capability of most other tribal
governments:
"The Navajo reservation covers many thousands of acres,
with a resident population of close to 200,000 and a tribal justice
budget in the millions of dollars. There are simply no Aboriginal
communities of that size in Canada." (Hamilton & Sinclair,
1991, p.268).
On the other hand, Hamilton & Sinclair also cite many
examples of tribal courts working well among smaller communities,
such as the Northwest Intertribal Court System (in Washington
State), which shares an aboriginal judiciary among sixteen different
tribes, involving communities of 200 to 500 people. They conclude
that
"It is clear that the existence of fully functioning
tribal court systems on a variety of Indian reservations in the
United States, many of them similar in size and socio-economic
status to Indian reserves in Manitoba, and the benefits which
those communities derive from them, are strong evidence that separate
Aboriginal justice systems are possible and practical." (p.269).
Considering Accommodationalist Strategies
The preceeding is not an exhaustive inventory of accommodative
initiatives, but does reflect the range of initiatives which have
been touted by those in the accomodational camp. For the most
part, they also represent the range of aboriginal justice initiatives
in which the federal government has expressed an interest, and
has been willing to fund. Although each is a positive effort,
it is also the case that the alternatives suggested do not call
into serious question the applicability of the dominant justice
system for natives, nor do any of the alternatives pose a threat
to the "endowed" philosophy of aboriginal rights that
the federal government has proferred, with mixed success, in the
courts.
Critical commentary on the accomodative strategies has been
abundant. This is particularly so for the "indigenization"
alternatives which try and accomodate native accused by offering
translation services and native courtworkers, or which suggest
that a sprinkling of native police officers, corrections officers
and justices of the peace will somehow sensitize and humanize
the system regarding what are often construed as "the problems
of Indian people". Their major advantage seems to be that
they are the easiest and "most practical" things to
do (e.g., see Task Force, 1990).
But perhaps this is another way of saying that they are only
simple add-ons which change the sizzle, but not the steak. Lyon
(1992) considers such changes mere appeasements, which only postpone,
rather than preclude, failure. Hamilton and Sinclair (1991) agree,
stating that such changes in and of themselves are superficial,
and do nothing to address the injustice that first led to considerations
of reform.
Sawatsky (1992) refers to this emphasis on gradual improvement
to the system as "evolutionary" change, which, in this
instance, he finds completely problematic: "The evolutionary
approach, unfortunately, is proving to be the most insidious form
of assimilation ever devised for the native community." (p.89).
The problem, he suggests, is that "When faced with the need
for change, the evolutionary approach does not seriously challenge
the institution itself or those who work within it. In fact, it
enhances its power. Gradually improving the system ... simply
legitimizes that structure." (p.90). McCaskill (1983) agrees,
suggesting that efforts to "patch up" the system in
this manner miss the point that it is the system itself which
must be questioned, particularly in terms of the respect it shows
for the "differing values and customs of native culture"
(p.297). Sawatsky (1992) concludes: "The evolutionary approach
clearly serves the purposes of assimilation, not self-determination."
(p.91).
The evaluation is more complex when it comes to accomodative
strategies such as the court incorporating Elders into the sentencing
process (e.g., Stuart, 1992). On the one hand, such a change shows
considerable sensitivity on the part of the presiding judge with
respect to physical and procedural attributes of the court which
have created barriers between the court and the community, and
a positive motivation to involve the community, and take their
beliefs and standards into consideration. On the other hand, if
the local community has historically exerted its own methods of
social control and dispute resolution, and is willing and capable
of making those decisions now, one has to question why there is
a need for Stuart at all. Indeed, Stuart's presence in the proceedings,
and his position as the one who is "responsible" for
making the "final" decision, can be criticized once
again as little more than assimilationism in accommodationalist
clothing.
Further to the above, one might consider the Elders who are
involved. The status of "Elder" is not synonymous simply
with the idea of "an older person" as is implied in
English. The overlap is true only to the extent that aging is
imperfectly associated with experience and learning; one becomes
an "Elder" by virtue of the wisdom and expertise which
is developed and shown across a variety situations. Ross (1992)
and Jackson (1992) have noted how many of the developments in
aboriginal policy over the last hundred years (and particularly
the Indian Act) have been destructive of aboriginal cultures
in the manner of having taken away situations of governance which
had provided elders with the opportunity to develop and show their
wisdom, thereby undermining their authority. With respect to Philip
Moses v the Queen, therefore, the question is whether Stuart
is reaffirming the Elders' role within the community by involving
them in the process, or, instead, is merely affirming their inferior
status to him, as representative of Her Majesty's justice. Perhaps
the best indications of this will come when and if Stuart and/or
his colleagues entertain a next step, where, for example, elders
and Stuart might agree to serve as part of an egalitarian 'sentencing
council' of sorts, e.g., where Stuart is one vote but not the
major decision-maker, or where Stuart orchestrates his own obsolescence
by putting sentencing decisions into the hands of the elders themselves.
Opinions have been less negative, and more ambivalent, with
respect to the creation of an aboriginal court, the beginnings
of which might be thought to have been evident in the South Island
criminal justice project. On the one hand, there is considerable
promise. Indeed, it is also hard to find fault with initiatives
such as the South Island criminal justice project, when they are
formulated in concert with the respective tribal government. More
generally, McCaskill (1983) has stated that one "... strategy
available to native people involves more middle-range goals. It
addresses the issue of the justice system being out of phase with
the customs and values of native society and seeks to establish
judicial institutions which are more consistent with those values.
The development of a separate Indian court system is an example
of an institution of this kind." (p.295).
The bigger issue is not so much the existence of tribal courts
per se, but whether the courts will be constrained to an
existence as aboriginal clones to the dominant Euro-Canadian system,
or whether aboriginal justice systems would be able to consider
and determine their own forms and development (e.g., which might
or might not involve codified law, and which might or might not
involve "courts" as we conceive them). In the latter
case, the central issue is not so much where one starts in the
implementation of an aboriginal justice system, but over who has
control over the gas pedal, steering wheel, and brake.
The Minister of Indian Affairs indicated that he and the Prime
Minister were "committed" to finding "...practical
ways to ensure that aboriginal communities can exercise greater
control over the administration of justice." (p.160), after
which he immediately added: "However, we must keep in mind
that there will clearly be some limitations on this control. ...
Indians must respect the laws of this country and the rights of
its non-native citizens." (Siddon, 1991, p.160). Siddon's
comments would seem to suggest that the shape of aboriginal justice
must conform to non-aboriginal conceptions of it -- the equivalent,
perhaps, to giving aboriginals control over the gas pedal and
brake, but keeping the steering wheel under governmental control.
But as Greschner (1992) notes:
"It is almost oxymoronic to talk of non-aboriginal conceptions
of aboriginal rights; if aboriginal rights are not given their
meaning by aboriginal peoples, they are not truly Aboriginal."
(p.344).
Ovide Mercredi, Head Chief of the Assembly of First Nations,
expresses a similar view. He is quoted in the Law Reform Commission's
(1991) report to have eschewed the idea that small-scale "fixing"
might solve the current situation, or that limits should be declared
a priori. Putting these matters in the context of broader
relations, he stated:
"The real issue is what some people have called cultural
imperialism, where one group of people who are distinct make a
decision for all other people. ... Our experiences are such that,
[even] if you make [the current system] more representative, it's
still your law that would apply, it would still be your police
forces that would enforce the laws, it would still be your courts
that would interpret them, and it would still be your corrections
system that houses the people that go through the court system.
It would not be our language that is used in the system. It would
not be our laws. It would not be our traditions, our customs or
our values that decide what happens in the system. That is what
I mean by cultural imperialism." (p.13).
As this again suggests, the central issue is one of the extent
to which federal politicians and bureaucrats believe in the virtues
of aboriginal self-determination, or will continue to take
an adversarial stance in their resort to litigation and control.
Greschner (1992) states that
"Truly new criminal justice systems, ones that will embody
and deliver the justice of and not merely to aboriginal
peoples, must be built on aboriginal concepts and traditions.
... Building 'just' criminal justice systems necessarily involves
not only including aboriginal peoples as participants in the systems'
substance and process, but ensuring that they are the systems'
dreamers, architects and caretakers." (pp.341-342).
The Law Reform Commission (1991) would agree, asserting that
"The time has come to co-operate in the creation of Aboriginal-controlled
systems of justice, for which many possible models exist."
(p.13). Many others have expressed similar sentiments (e.g., Bellegarde,
1991; Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991; Jackson, 1992; Joe, 1991;
Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992), and suggest that the only
thing impeding such developments occuring is political will, or
the lack of it, since the legal foundation to enable such developments
clearly exist (e.g., Jackson, 1992; Lyon, 1992; Mackay, 1992).
Just what such systems might involve, requires first some consideration
of the traditions that have characterized aboriginal justice.
Traditions in Aboriginal Justice
What aboriginal justice may have involved during the "pre-contact"
period is largely unknown, though Macklem (1992) suggests that
"It is common knowledge that prior to the arrival of
European settlers, the Aboriginal peoples of North America had
complex and sophisticated forms of economic, social, political
and legal organization, including methods and procedures for dealing
with misconduct on the part of individuals. ... Traditional arrangements
respecting the administration of criminal justice were but one
component of the complex web of social and political practices
that constituted and reproduced Aboriginal communities prior to
European contact." (pp.281-282)
With the arrival of the Europeans, however, came exposure
to an alien system of justice. The differences between aboriginal
and European legal systems were legion.10
Social Control, But With the Emphasis on "Social"
Aboriginal-European differences are evident even with such
basic considerations as what comprised "crime", which,
as one might expect, was associated also with differences in what
one might consider "justice". Hamilton and Sinclair
(1991) assert that aboriginal communities showed tolerance for
a broader range of behaviour, i.e., fewer acts were considered
"criminal" among the aboriginals than among the Europeans.
One indicator of tolerance was the absence of "crimes without
victims".
Indeed, Sawatsky (1992) suggests that there is no aboriginal
word for "crime" at all. Recall that most aboriginal
communities were sufficiently small for control interactions to
occur on an ongoing, face-to-face basis, often on the basis of
familial structures. Banishment would be used only in the most
extreme of circumstances; otherwise, reconciliation was the objective
being sought, no matter what the situation. Given that there was
no behaviour for which a separate control system was activated
(i.e., all matters were considered by the relevant families),
there would be no need to designate a separate "crime"
category, since there was no "crime" system to engage.
Instead, therefore, the emphasis was on the recognition and resolution
of injury, harm, conflicts and disputes.
Responsibility and Accountability
Within the Euro-Canadian tradition, in contrast, with its
specialized and professional control apparatus, "crime"
demarcates the raw material which falls within the mandate of
those involved in "criminal justice". A crucial determination
is that of guilt, and the actus reus (or criminal act)
is one of two considerations (the other being mens rea,
or intent) for that determination. Monture-Okanee and Turpel (1992)
explain that aboriginal systems do not make a distinction between
the act (actus reus) and its mental elements (mens rea,
or intent). As this suggests, there is often said to be no word
that is the equivalent of "guilt" in aboriginal languages,
though it is perhaps more informative to say that there is no
such thing as an "accident" in aboriginal systems (see
also Jackson, 1992; Sawatsky, 1992). The questions in aboriginal
justice are those of accountability and responsibility; if one
is responsible for a deleterious consequence, then accountability
falls to that person and his or her kin group. Whether one intended
to cause the consequence is beside the point; one is responsible
for the restoration of harmony within the group.11
Consistent with these notions are several consequences, i.e.,
(1) adversarial proceedings are not necessary; one takes responsibility
for one's actions and admits one's guilt in the aboriginal setting,
unlike the Euro-Canadian system where one is not obliged to say
anything, while the Crown is obliged to prove its case; and (2)
the emphasis is on building consensus among all involved as to
what the appropriate resolution to re-establish harmony might
be (Sawatsky, 1992).
Inter- and Intrafamilial Resolution
A further difference lay in the determination of who was affected
by the crime, and hence relevant to its resolution. Jackson (1992)
notes that it is common to find aboriginal justice systems treating
"crime" as an action against the community, not as an
action against the abstract "state". This clearly has
implications for the way that justice is sought. For Europeans,
the aggrieved state brings an action against a perpetrator; among
aboriginals, resolution is sought among people who know the offender
and the victim. As this implies, further differences exist in
the view that is taken of European desiderata like judicial distance
and impartiality. While the Euro-Canadian justice system attempts
to avoid intimacy to avoid what would be perceived as a conflict
of interest, aboriginals perceive the use of strangers to decide
such matters as an absurdity -- justice can only come when all
relevant persons, i.e., all those affected, including "victim"
and "offender" and their respective families, are involved.
As Monture-Okanee and Turpel (1992) describe:
"The person with authority to resolve conflicts among
aboriginal peoples in their community must be someone known to
them who can look at all aspects of a problem, not an unknown
person set apart from the community in an 'impartial' way. A 'judge'
from a non-aboriginal context is simply an outsider without authority."
(p.246).
The role of Elders is important here, particularly those who
are associated with the families of offender and victim, plus
those who are particularly expert in matters of conflict resolution.
Justice as a Part of Everyday Life
As this further suggests, the restoration of justice was considered
very much a part of the broader network of social relations within
the community, rather than a specialized domain which was the
province of specialists. From an aboriginal perspective then,
as Monture-Okanee and Turpel (1992) assert, "...a system
in which laws are accessible only through lawyers and professionals
seems very remote, unapproachable, and not connected to the kinship
structure of aboriginal communities." (p.245). Indeed, Jaenen
(1988), on the basis of his study of 17th century Amerindian attitudes
regarding the French, suggests that the impersonality of European
justice was, to aboriginal eyes, rather extreme:
"The Amerindian distaste for French educational procedures
carried over into a general lack of appreciation for French judicial
procedures, law and government. The rigidity, lack of flexibility,
authoritarianism and excessive concentration of power at the top
of administrative pyramids contrasted unfavourably with the democratic
procedures in Huron and Iroquois cantons." (p.126).
Reconciliation and Restoration
Traditional aboriginal justice also was at odds with European
justice in the very objectives which it appeared to seek. Jaenen
(1988), for examples, notes that "French justice did not
appeal to the Iroquois because it restricted itself to punishing
the wrongdoer, while neglecting to give satisfaction to the wronged."
(p.127). As one might expect in a justice system which seeks face-to-face
resolution among persons who are familiar to one another, rather
than a more impersonal and independent adjudication, the emphasis
in aboriginal justice systems has generally been on reconciliation,
and the restoration of harmony among the group, rather than punishment.
As Jackson (1992) stated, aboriginal conceptions of justice typically
"...place a primary emphasis on restoration and reintegration
of an offender into the fabric of communal life, in contrast with
the primary emphasis on punishment and isolation which has characterized
Euro-Canadian concepts of criminal justice." (p.166)
Monture-Okanee and Turpel (1992) add:
"...[T]he Canadian system is grounded in a belief in
'correctional' punishment based on banishment to special institutions
where the goals of retribution, deterrence and reform of the offender
legitimize the punishment. Punishment is a concept which is not
culturally relevant to aboriginal social experience. Banishment
is the most severe remedy available under aboriginal systems of
justice. ... Incarceration must be understood as banishment...
It is seen as counterproductive, creating further obstacles to
the restoration of balance and harmony after an anti-social act."
(p.248).
The irony here is that the incarcerative sentences that the
Euro-Canadian courts give out routinely are analagous to the most
severe that one can give from the aboriginal perspective. At the
same time, the problem for aboriginal communities is that while
the courts believe they are "doing something" by incapacitating
the offender, in fact they do not, since the important elements
of reconciliation and restoration required by the community are
not possible when the offender has been banished without resolution
in the community having first been sought. These differences between
aboriginal and European justice systems led Jennings (1976) to
comment:
"When one considers the floggings, jailings, hangings,
torture and burnings inflicted by European states for the multitude
of crimes that did not even exist in Indian society, one becomes
painfully aware that an incalculably great proportion of European
violence against persons was inflicted by the very agencies whose
ostensible function was to reduce violence." (Jennings, 1976,
p.111-112; cited by Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991, p.24).
Taken together, the above reveal considerable differences
between the Euro-Canadian and traditional aboriginal justice systems,
at every level -- pervasiveness, personnel, objectives, means.
Numerous authors view these to be so great as to defy any mutual
accomodation between aboriginal and the Euro-Canadian system,
leading them to call for the creation of a separate aboriginal
justice system (e.g., Bellegarde, 1991; Hamilton & Sinclair,
1991; Jackson, 1992; Joe, 1991; Law Reform Commission, 1991; Monture-Okanee
& Turpel, 1992).
Prospects of Autonomous Aboriginal Justice
Although the above offers dimensions which have been identified
as characteristic of most aboriginal justice systems, two more
specific descriptions may help depict what "aboriginal justice"
might look like in specific contexts.
Justice Among the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en First Nations of British Columbia
are among those First Nations who have retained much of their
tradition despite degeneration at the hands of the Indian Act
for more than 100 years. They are of interest to the current discussion
for several reasons. First, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en have shown
concrete interest in the development of justice proposals, as
is shown in the extensive care which went into the preparation
of Unlocking Aboriginal Justice, a proposal prepared jointly
by the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Society, Smithers Indian
Friendship Centre, and the Upper Skeena Counselling and Legal
Assistance Society (1989). Their proposal offers considerable
detail concerning traditional Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en structures,
and in describing how the system of justice they envision would
integrate with those structures.
It is of interest that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en have also
attempted other routes in their history. The authors note one
earlier effort at the turn of the century -- the Durier system,
named after Bishop Paul Durier who initiated it -- which used
an externally imposed system, and was a disaster (see also Jackson,
1992). More recently, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en also attempted
to codify their legal system, but that, too, was problematic.
The proposal recalls:
"[S]everal researchers have tried to codify Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en law and have not succeeded. This was not because
they were incompetent but because interpretation of those laws
depends on the context of the incident to which it is being applied,
such as the relationships of the people involved, the ownership
of the land where it took place and so on. As a result, codification
projects produce either a few lines of basic principles or evolve
into long discourses on kinship, history, language, society and
culture which may be informative but are not legal codes as understood
by western jurisprudence." (p.25)
With regards to other alternatives, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
state:
"...[T]he setting up of parallel justice systems for
native communities -- with native police, native courts and native
jails -- will not work unless the society already has equivalent
institutions of its own. The decentralized Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
societies cannot accomodate the hierarchical court system and
specialized enforcement powers of the police." (p.25).
This leads the authors to conclude that
"If, as we suggest, the content of indigenous justice,
that is its principles, laws and precedents, is to be used in
a meaningful way, it must function within the structure of indigenous
justice. Attempts to fit the content of one system into the structure
of another are bound to fail." (p.25).
Accordingly, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en propose changes which
will reflect their own traditions. By way of description, the
authors note that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en are two different
but "...socially integrated peoples who live in the Upper
Skeena region of northwestern BC." (p.4). The Gitksan number
about 5,000, and are related to the Nisga'a and Tsimpsian, while
the 2,000 Wet'suwet'en are a part of the Athabaskan cultural and
linguistic family. "The formal, structured Gitksan society
contrasts with the more egalitarian and spirit conscious Wet'suwet'en,
yet for some thousands of years the two peoples have influenced
and borrowed from one another to create a shared society without
submerging the distinctiveness of either people." (p.5).
Like most other First Nations, family structures were the
basic control institution, and most interaction and resolution
occured on a face-to-face basis. The elders played a significant
role in this regard.
"Authority rather than power governs decision-making
and authority is based on personal respect. In this context, political
and economic decisions are by consensus, with greater weight given
to the thoughts of those with proven ability, experience and wisdom.
... Decisions and laws are not policed. Instead, there is a withdrawal
of support from the person or group making the unpopular decision.
Those who offend established laws and morals lose authority in
the community." (pp.13-14).
The proposal further notes that, for the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en,
justice is not an issue that can be isolated from other aspects
of life: "For a Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en there is no such
thing as a purely legal transaction or a purely legal institution.
All events in both day-to-day and formal life have social, political,
spiritual, economic as well as legal aspects." (p.15).
The basic unit in both Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en society is
the House -- named after the longhouses in which they used to
live -- and there is no higher authority than the House chief.
Houses join together in Clans (there are 4 Gitksan and 5 Wet'suwet'en
clans). Within a house, there are "wings" of the head
chiefs, as well as elders, all of whom are consulted on important
decisions. "Authority to deal with outsiders on specific
issues on behalf of some or all of the chiefs in the society can
be granted to anyone. ... It is only in this context that jurisdiction
can be asserted beyond the House and Clan." (pp.18-19).
The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en cite various problems they have in
dealing with the Canadian justice system, such as its specialized
bureaucracies, the emphasis on punishment and revenge rather than
rehabilitation, and its individualized notions of responsibility.
In contrast, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en emphasize law in the general
context of social relations. Responsibility is laid upon the offender's
House rather than on the offender alone, and the emphasis with
respect to "sentencing" is on compensation and the restoration
of harmony.
On the other hand, the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en note that their
communal health is substantially less than would be desirable.
Still, the authors state that their society's core has not yet
died; the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en believe that they have survived
sufficiently intact to begin regrowth and renewed cultural development.
Nonetheless, the implication of their situation is that implementation
of their vision of aboriginal justice will require an extended
committment. In this regard, their proposal seems to have a strong
sense of direction, and appears based on an understanding of contemporary
strengths and weaknesses.
"It is recognized that in many areas there cannot be
a simple switch from the imposed state system to indigenous self-government.
The acute social crisis in which the people find themselves together
with external cicumstances much changed since they last exercised
complete jurisdiction, demand a careful thinking through of how
social repair and control of anti-social behaviour is to be accomplished."
(p.27).
They suggest professionals will be needed, but that these
people must come under the authority of the House chiefs; worker
contracts could be developed which allow the integrity of the
Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en system, while not undermining or threatening
the integrity of professional ethical dicta. The four priority
areas the proposal identifies are (1) assault; (2) spousal abuse;
(3) rape; and (4) child sexual abuse. The routes they propose
to deal with these problems involve (1) use of diversion provisions
already existing under the Young Offenders Act; (2) a collaborative
and egalitarian sentencing advisor process involving 2 or 3 community
members and a judge of the Provincial court system; (3) parole
advisors; and (4) alternative dispute resolution processes.
The specifics of the proposal seem well considered, with an
estimated cost of approximately $2 million over a three year period.
Early monies would go to the computerization of genealogies (a
central element in identifying who one's 'relevant' family members
are for any given action), developing worker contracts, negotiating
concrete details with provincial authorities, and training those
who will be involved. Education would go in both directions, i.e.,
educating provincial officials about Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en justice,
and educating the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en about the province's
system. Implementation and monitoring would be in place by the
third year of the project.
This is not to say that problematic issues would not surface.
Indeed, the authors seem aware of several potential problem areas.
For example, they note that the western tradition emphasizes individual
rights, while the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en attempt to balance individual
and collective concerns. Accordingly, some areas of tension might
arise, one example being concerns about due process. The authors
suggest that in recent years in the Canadian justice system, family
issues have been dealt with differently by giving greater family
input; in turn, therefore, they suggest that the "nuclear"
family emphasis of western law should be extended to a the extended
conception of family that is meaningful to the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en,
and that the applicability of these principles should be extended
to both criminal and civil domains.
All things considered, the model for indigenous justice which
the authors propose would appear emminently achievable, and their
proposals would not appear to require any changes in legislation
to be introduced. Although areas of prospective tension are acknowledged,
the problems do not appear insurmountable, and the result would
distort neither the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en nor Canadian systems
of governance. Indeed, the authors suggest their model may have
applicability to other aboriginal groups, as well as to many non-native
rural communities (Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Society et
al, 1989).
Justice Among the Mi'kmaq
Unlike the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en, the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia
have not, to my knowledge, articulated a specific proposal to
implement a system of aboriginal justice. Instead, the implementation
of aboriginal justice is seen within the broader context of M'kmaq
self-determination. In that regard, several descriptions of traditional
Mi'kmaq justice are available (e.g., Denny, 1992; henderson, 1992).
Denny decribes some of the basic principles of Mi'kmawey
(i.e., the Mi'kmaq way). He notes that Mi'kmaq customary law is
called habenquedouic, which is translated as "he did
not begin it; he has paid him back; quits and (is) good friends"
(p.104). Similarly, henderson (1992) describes that
"The habenquedouic law of the Mi'kmaq is based on a tort
principle of criminal law. It embodies the principle that he or
she did not begin the offence; he or she has paid the aggrieved
party back, and everyone quits and becomes good friends. The guilty
one, even in killings, can repent his or her fault and makes satisfaction
by offering presents and other suitable atonements to the aggrieved
party. The idea of crimes against the sovereign or society was
unknown to the Mi'kmaq law." (p.53).
For Denny (1992), the basic principles of habenquedouic
are several. Further to henderson (1992), Denny notes that "Order
is a matter of kinship, education, and personal self-control.
... Aggressiveness is considered wrongful and contrary to human
dignity." (p.103). Similar in some ways to the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en, conflicts and "crimes" were not considered
"public" wrongs, but rather were private matters for
the consideration of the relevant families. Indeed, "Coercive
institutions [were] generally absent, if not vigorously opposed"
(p.103), and families would normally iron out conflicts among
themselves. A "satisfactory" resolution occured when
conflict was terminated, and harmony restored: "Harmony,
not justice, is the ideal." (p.104). Denny (1992) summarizes
by saying that "Customary law is a process of reconciliation
based on shared examples or models of conduct" (p.104); resolution
is arrived at consensually through social interaction, with the
only binding obligations being those which arose with the consent
of all relevant parties.
Denny's proposals for the Mi'kmaq are that Mi'kmaq tribal
courts should be created, with exclusive jurisdiction on their
lands. He asserts the system should also be sufficiently autonomous
so that the Mi'kmaq would be able to use their own laws, and borrow
and apply, or ignore, any of the Criminal Code as they
saw fit. Denny (1992) also asserts that it should be the Mi'kmaq
who have the right to chose whether extradition to the Provincial
courts is appropriate, whenever Mi'kmaq citizens are involved
as accused. Mi'kmaq who get in trouble off the reserve would be
tried in federal rather than provincial courts.
Unlocking Aboriginal Justice
The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en and the Mi'kmaq conceptions of justice
described above are by no means exhaustive of aboriginal conceptions
of justice, although they do incorporate many of the attributes
that are typical of many traditional aboriginal justice systems.
Their inclusion offers the reader some more concrete examples
of the aspirations of at least two First Nations, rather than
leaving the discussion at the level of assertion of abstract general
principles. But if the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en and the Mi'kmaq are
interested in pusuing their own brand of aboriginal justice, then
what is stopping them?
Impediments to the Development of Aboriginal Justice
Systems
Lack of Interest?
One prospective impediment that can be dispensed with quickly
is the possibility that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en and Mi'kmaq are
unique among contemporary First Nations, and that other First
Nations may not be interested in the development of aboriginal
justice systems which embody traditional aboriginal concepts of
justice. This is clearly not the case.
The Head Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Ovide Mercredi,
has gone on record to state the desirability of such systems (see
Law Reform Commission, 1991, p.13), as have numerous other aboriginal
leaders and their representatives (e.g., Bellegarde, 1991; Joe,
1991; Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992). Interest is also evident
in aboriginal justice projects which have been created within
the accomodational framework, but which are seen by the aboriginal
participants as prospective stepping stones to full-fledged aboriginal
justice (e.g., see Tennant, 1992a, regarding the South Island
Project). And I have yet to hear or read of any aboriginal leader
arguing against having the choice of developing such a system,
in the general context of further elaborating aboriginal self-determination.
Legal Impediments
A second possibility is that separate aboriginal justice systems
cannot be developed simply because the law, and, in particular,
the Constitution, might somehow preclude it. Considerable legal
opinion has been amassed at this point regarding possibilities
for a separate aboriginal justice system, with the conclusion
that there is nothing in Canadian law which would preclude such
developments (e.g., see Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991; Law Reform
Commission, 1991).
Certainly there would seem to be no impediments because of
current constitutional arrangements respecting federal-provincial
responsibilities (MacKay, 1992). Prospects for aboriginal justice
systems are also consistent with all treaties which have been
signed with aboriginal leaders thus far (Wildsmith, 1992); are
easily construed within the fiduciary responsibilities of the
federal government with respect to ensuring the continuing vitality
of First Nations (Lyon, 1992; Macklem, 1992); and would also seem
a virtually recommended course of action given international agreements
like the First Covenant, which acknowledge the rights of "peoples"
to self-determination (Sanders, 1985, 1992a, 1992b). Many would
argue that there could be no more desirable first step in a process
of "de-colonization" (Jackson, 1992).
Other worries may exist about the consequences of enduring
multiple justice systems in the country -- would it not create
a jurisdictional conundrum? Numerous observers suggest that it
would not (e.g., Jackson, 1992), noting that Canada already exhibits
legal pluralism in its incorporation of the Civil Code of Quebec.
It is a state of affairs we live with daily, and is institutionally
validated and supported by the Constitutional arrangement which
guarantees three seats on the Supreme Court of Canada to judges
from Quebec who have experience with that Code. This precedent
for legal plurality, and its legal validation in the structure
of the Supreme Court, would suggest that similar possibilities
are open to Canada's third founding nation, which is notably the
only one of the three that can call these lands their homeland.
Indeed, it seems a virtual travesty that the multitude of First
Nations who governed these lands since time immemorial have no
place whatsoever in the contemporary institutional structures
of the country. With respect to legal considerations, therefore,
change of the sort discussed herein would seem to be purely a
question of the political will to carry it out (MacKay, 1992).
Thornier Legal Issues: The Charter
Charter considerations are important in several respects,
particularly insofar as many aspects of aboriginal justice challenge
us to reconsider our allegiances when faced with competing positive
values. Much of this is embodied in the prospective concurrent
recognition of individual and collective rights. Sanders (1991)
discusses these, noting that the current Charter manifests an
allegiance to the western liberal tradition of individual rights.
At its heart is a balancing of the interests of the individual
and the state, as well as ensuring equality of treatment for all
citizens, i.e., the right, as an individual, to be treated like
anyone else, regardless of group membership. The same allegiance
to individual rights is evident in the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations
in 1948 (Sanders, 1992a).
Weaver (1981) notes the allegiance of former Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau to such an individual conceptions of rights, as
well as his aversion to collective rights, which he felt proferred
"special" status, offered an artificial crutch to cultural
groups which should be healthy enough to survive on their own,
and encouraged a tyranny of the minority. Certainly that conception
was evident in the Trudeau-Chretien White Paper of 1969 (see Weaver,
1981), which recommended the termination of Indian status (and
was soundly rejected by all aboriginal groups), and is equally
evident in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which was formulated
by the Trudeau government (D.Sanders, 1991).
The problem is that some individuals, and particularly members
of distinct social minorities, are concerned as much with their
cultural as their individual survival. It is fine for members
of cultural majorities to argue "we are all equal" when
their numbers allow them to control the social institutions as
well as their agendae, thereby creating a tyranny of the majority.
"Cultural minorities seek more than the right of their
individual members to equality and participation within the larger
society. They also seek distinct group survival. Because
economic and social forces, as well as state policies, tend to
promote assimilation, the leaders of cultural minorities often
look to the state for support. They seek either protection
or autonomy as the means to ensure that their collectivities
can survive and develop." (D.Sanders, 1991, p.370; my emphasis).
Such protection can come through formal recognition of collective
rights, as is evident in the two more recent (1966) International
Covenants to which Canada is signatory (i.e., regarding the rights
of peoples to self-determination). Similar explicit and formal
recognition has not been forthcoming domestically, the closest
example perhaps being the failed constitional proposals of the
1992 referendum, which acknowledged the "inherent right"
of aboriginal peoples to self-government.
Implicit recognition has been cited in two locations.
First, the inclusion of the infamous "notwithstanding"
clause of the Charter was seen as a way of acknowledging the collective
rights of the francophones in the Province of Quebec (Sanders,
1991). Aboriginal groups do not have such access, however, although
some unique arrangement as a third order of government may yet
be granted. Second, many have argued that acknowledgement of aboriginal
collective rights is implicit in section 35(1), which acknowledges
the "existing rights of aboriginal peoples", since self-determination
for aboriginal peoples is arguably an existing right (e.g., Ahenakew,
1985; Lyon, 1992; Macklem, 1992; Monture-Okanee & Turpel,
1992; Sanders, 1991).
The limits to tolerance are challenged when the minority collective
decides to protect a practice which conflicts with our notions
of individual rights. Certain aspects of traditional aboriginal
justice, for example, are seen to conflict in this manner. Sections
7 to 14 of the Charter offer citizens an array of protections
from unreasonable governmental incursion. One affirms the right
to avoid self-incrimination, for example, while aboriginal traditions
require one to give an account of oneself, and to accept responsibility
for the effects of ones actions. Similarly, another section guarantees
an impartial trial, while justice in the traditional aboriginal
setting is more likely to have been sought through non-adversarial,
consensus-oriented discussion (e.g., Jackson, 1992; Monture-Okanee
& Turpel, 1992; Sawatsky, 1992). A third section guarantees
that persons will not be subject to unreasonable search and seizure,
but the Coast Salish, for example, utilize the process of "grabbings",
where an "offender", at the instigation of an Elder
or family member, can be grabbed against his or her will and taken
to the longhouse for healing (Tennant, 1992a).12 What safeguards,
if any, should be imposed on that practice, or is that question
a matter solely of concern to the aboriginal community?
Other considerations are easily imagined. What if traditional
aboriginal justice involved sentences of death, or violent practices
such as spearing? What if the practice in any given First Nation
did not recognize sexual equality? As Sanders (1991) notes, "The
more difficult cases involve minority cultural practices that
violate highly valued human rights norms, such as life and health,
sexual equality, and nondiscrimination." (p.384)
The question of what, if any, Charter requirements might be
imposed a priori upon aboriginal systems of justice, is
a fascinating issue whose complexities can only be hinted at here.
Hamilton & Sinclair (1991) argue that First Nations governments
must have carte blanche (as a right, not simply 'as delegated')
to create a system which embodies their own integrity. They also
argue against having aboriginal justice systems subject to the
Charter, given its antipathy with many native values, and emphasis
on individual rather than collective rights. They do, however,
leave the door open for a subset-Charter (i.e., choose where applicable),
or the entrenched right of First Nations to implement the 'notwithstanding'
clause, or the creation of a unique 'Aboriginal Charter of Rights'
(see also Jackson, 1992; Ronnenberg, 1991).
Legal analyses of constitutional requirements in this regard
suggest that the most important aspect to be considered is the
right of appeal. In that regard, Macklem (1992) reports that Aboriginal
peoples would have to argue the equivalent of a "notwithstanding"
position, or would have to provide an "opting out" alternative
to individual aboriginals who might wish to be tried in the Euro-Canadian
courts.
"If, for example, a tribal court system is developed
that deviates from Anglo-Canadian norms of criminal procedure,
it may run the risk of infringing constitutional rights of an
accused. By providing an accused an option to have his or her
case heard in provincial court, or by providing for a subsequent
appeal to the provincial court system, the legislature may increase
the chance that the judiciary will accept the initiative as demonstrably
justified under s.1." (p.298).
The main problem with this, however, is that while such an
appeal mechanism may appease Euro-Canadian interests, one might
speculate that it would have little appeal for aboriginals who
have been arguing for separate aboriginal justice systems at all
levels, and not just entry level adjudication. What improvement
is there if aboriginal justice systems are merely made subservient
to Euro-Canadian Courts of Appeal? Two alternatives present themselves.
First, prospective aboriginal justice systems might include aboriginal
venues of appeal in their design, i.e., Aboriginal Courts of Appeal,
or an Aboriginal Supreme Court. A second alternative would be
to revise the current appeal courts to include some mandatory
level of aboriginal participation, in the same manner that the
Supreme Court of Canada now guarantees three seats to members
who have experience in the Quebec Courts.
Though such alternatives seem reasonable in many respects,
one wonders how many strings might be attached before one is no
longer promoting the existence of "aboriginal justice",
but rather, creating little more than the contemporary equivalent
of the Indian Act, with assimilation once again the objective,
i.e., something akin to the attitude that "we will let you
have a justice system to run however you choose, as long as you
run it according to our rules."
Cultural Impediments
It might be argued that it would be imprudent to ignore the
overall weakness of aboriginal governments at this time, given
a certain amount of structural degeneration at the hands of an
assimilation-oriented federal government, particularly through
the Indian Act, for more than a century. The legacy of
Canada's assimilative strategies has been considerable, particularly
with respect to the Canadian government's "success"
at creating conflict where, before, none would have existed.
Egalitarian social relations among native men and women have
degenerated over several generations of patriarchy imposed by
the Indian Act, and the colonials who implemented it (see
Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992; Payne, 1992). The exclusionary
"citizenship" rules, which stripped native women who
married whites of their Indian status has further divided aboriginal
First Nations, many of whom had traditionally bequeathed titles
and responsibilities through matrilineage (Greschner, 1992; Joseph,
1991; Wilson, 1985).
The most extensive consideration here has come with respect
to the role of women in aboriginal governance, where First Nations'
womens' groups, such as Native Women of Canada (NWC), argued during
the 1992 referendum debates, "...that women are excluded
from native organizations, and that the existing power structures
and process do not encourage women's participation." (Hammersmith,
1992, p.53). After explaining that "NWC is an umbrella group
that includes status and non-status Indian women and Métis
women, and representatives of provincial native women's groups."
(p.53), Hammersmith further explains that the "NWC argues
that native women belong to largely dysfunctional nations in which
justice and equity are practically non-existent." (p.53).
The problem is that "Native women belong to aboriginal nations
that have been shaped for three or four generations by the paternalistic
provisions of the Indian Act." (p.53).
Traditional forms of governance have also been undermined,
by a century of funding Band Councils, with the result that, in
many communities, Band Councils and more traditional structures
now conflict over funding and tribal policies (e.g., Hornung,
1991; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991; Tennant, 1990; and York &
Pindera, 1991). Hammersmith (1992) adds that further difficulties
arose from the days of the residential schools, when aboriginal
children were taken from their families, and not treated well,
thus creating generations of dysfunctional people. It also made
school a very undesirable place to be. Some made it through the
educational system, however, and those people have now become
the new, elected Indian elite.
"They know what the game is, so they play that game.
And the federal government takes advantage of this. It only recognizes
certain people as spokespersons -- those who are elected and have
adapted to a system the government has concocted and imposed upon
us. For Métis people, it is municipal governments. For
status Indians, it is band councils. When you ask the band councils,
the chiefs or the mayors to change something, they first have
to get permission from the people who give them funding."
(Hammersmith, 1992, p.55).
Hammersmith also notes that these new leaders are paid leaders
-- a status that did not traditionally exist. One formerly took
part in the leadership of the community out of a sense of role
or duty. "The result is nepotism, which our political leaders
have learned very well from the wider governments." (p.56).
The worst cases are depicted as sellouts -- essentially Department
of Indian Affairs employees, passing on the white man's message,
and accomplishing nothing for their people.
It is also the case that tribal Elders, who were once at the
heart of aboriginal governance, are now in a more precarious position.
The status of tribal elder was an achieved status, gained by virtue
of demonstrations of wisdom in dealing with matters such as governance
and justice, but recall that those opportunities were constrained,
if not denied. by the forced creation of Band Councils, and the
imposed paramountcy of a foreign justice system (Jackson, 1992;
Ross, 1992). Accordingly, tribal elders have seen their status
decline, and with it, their influence. In his studies among the
Inuit in the Canadian Arctic, Griffiths (personal communication)
has indicated that, in some communities, tribal elders are in
fact the primary victims, taunted ad nauseum by younger
offenders.
The situation is captured by an analogy included in Unlocking
Aborginal Justice (Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Society
et al, 1989), which warrants repeating here. The image is of a
person who falls into an icy river, and begins to endure its hypothermic
effects. Arteries begin to shut down as the body attempts to save
what it can, trying at least to keep its core intact. If the numbing
cold continues, the whole body will die; if removed and properly
treated, a process of renewal may begin, and the body as a whole
can recover. The person represents aboriginal peoples, while European
contact is the icy water in which they have been submerged.
Certainly it is in everyone's interest for the indigenous
peoples of this continent to flourish. But one cannot help but
wonder whether some instant recognition of aboriginal governance
would involve throwing a lead weight to a drowning person. Would
it be helpful to burden aboriginal peoples while they are still
in the water? Or should one concentrate first on getting them
ashore? The latter would seem to make more sense, but does it
not provide the basis for even greater paternalism, i.e., the
attitude that "We will give you government when We think
you are ready"?
Hammersmith (1992) is among those to argue that, notwithstanding
these dilemmas, responsibility for First Nations governance must
lie with First Nations. Hammersmith notes that change for aboriginal
peoples must come from within aboriginal communities, and that
it would be a mistake to look for the feds to place "strings"
on further aboriginal autonomy, e.g., "We recognize your
nationhood but we don't like the way women are treated. So we
will impose a solution on you." (p.57). "Canada should
not be asked to solve the problem: the result would be just another
version of the Indian Act. ... This is just the continuation of
a policy of genocide." (p.58). Greschner (1992) agrees with
these assertions, noting that many policy makers have expressed
the view that "...self-determination, which in the context
of this study means aboriginal justice systems, cannot be permitted
by the non-aboriginal Canadian government because aboriginal women
would be left at the mercy of sexist aboriginal men." (p.339).
Greschner argues that this is little more than a self-serving
and politically expedient justification to do nothing, and/or
to interfere, dressed in politically correct clothing. As Greschner
(1992) stated, aboriginal policy dictated by non-aboriginals can
hardly be called aboriginal self-determination.
Assimilative Pressures of Government Funding
I have often thought that the most powerful element of the
European, and particularly the British, legacy, was its bureaucracy.
Certainly the documentation that is at the core of bureaucratic
functioning serves to create history, while denying it to others
with an oral past (e.g., see Stanley, 1983; Wolf, 1982). Monolithic
bureaucracies also seem very effective at dictating agendae by
their very functioning, as is described by the Assembly of First
Nations (AFN, 1991), who lament the nature of their interactions
with the federal government.
The litany is an extensive one. With respect to land claims,
for example, the AFN laments the asymmetry of control which exists
over the entire process:
"...[T]he federal government sets itself up as the judge
and jury in dealing with claims against itself. It sets the criteria,
decides what claims are acceptable, and controls the entire negotiation
process, including funding support. Clearly, in the democratic
world there are few examples of such a grievance procedure being
so totally controlled by one party in a dispute." (p.233).
Government can also take advantage of its position to unilaterally
define (and change) the negotiational turf, as the AFN suggests
the government did in the 1980s with respect to claims settlements.
At base, the government sets the timetable, and can deal with
matters at its leisure. Regarding comprehensive claim settlements,
for example, the AFN notes that
"If by chance a comprehensive claim is accepted, it is
added to a waiting list. It is federal policy that only six claims
can be negotiated at any one time. ... This means that claimants
on the waiting list have no way of protecting their rights and
interests while waiting their turn at negotiations. At the present
rate the wait could take over fifty years or more. ... The federal
government maintains that participation in the process is voluntary
and that First Nations cannot be forced into agreements. In reality,
the only alternative to the process is the court system, which
is expensive, adversarial in nature, and without any assurance
that the federal government will honour the court's decision."
(AFN, 1991, p.238).
To this, the AFN add that
"Another means by which the government controls the negotiation
process is through financial support to claimants. Loan funding
is provided to cover negotiation costs ... but the use of these
funds is very closely monitored. Any use of loan funds deemed
inappropriate by federal officials may result in reductions or
suspension of funding. ... The government's contention that loans
are interest free is inaccurate. All loans become interest bearing
upon the approval of agreements-in-principle. ... The experience
of claimants has been that upon final settlement repayment of
loans and interest is calculated and scheduled into the compensation
package in a manner more advantageous to the federal treasury
than the claimant." (pp.238-239).
Funding sources can also wield control by the timing associated
with payments, and the uncertainty of whether agreements or contracts
will be extended (Jackson, 1992). Tennant (1992a), for example,
notes that although the federal government funded the South Island
aboriginal justice project, the funding committment was solely
for a two year trial period; longer term planning, on the other
hand, has been thwarted because of the ambiguity of knowing whether
funding will proced beyond that point.
And finally, the asymmetry of resources allows the federal
government to make unilateral judgements that might or might not
be agreed to by an independent third party, let alone the First
Nations who are their object. As the AFN describe in the context
of claims settlements,
"...[M]any of these problems exist due to one important
aspect of the policy; it is administered by DIAND, with legal
support from Justice, which puts the federal government in a conflict
of interest. The fact that the federal government has appointed
itself judge and jury in dealing with claims against itself further
erodes any credibility this policy might ever have had among aboriginal
peoples and is contrary to the principles of natural justice.
It is basically an extension of the racist and paternalistic attitude
towards aboriginal peoples that is characteristic of Canada's
colonial traditions." (p.244).
While the AFN are probably correct when they conclude that
the current situation "...does little to enhance the present
government's desired image of Canada as a champion of human rights"
(p.246), the federal government's approach continues to be characterized
by the rules of hardball politics. But there are other, more subtle,
ways that bureaucracies can influence events. As the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
recognize in their proposal entitled Unlocking Aboriginal Justice
(Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Society et al, 1989), one way
bureaucracies exert assimilative force is through the pressure
that exists to have a compatable structure in order to "talk"
with and to the bureaucracy effectively. Accordingly, more decentralized
societies, or First Nations which view matters like justice from
a more holistic rather than specialized perspective, may find
themselves in a bureaucratic void of mismatching structures.
It is interesting to note, for example, that despite the quality
of the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en proposal on Unlocking Aboriginal
Justice (Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Society et al, 1989),
that proposal has never been funded by either provincial or federal
authorities. A major reason for this is apparently that their
proposal does not "fit" neatly into any particular bureaucratic
niche. As the authors recount in a supplementary report (Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
Education Society et al, 1990),
"We anticipated, correctly as it turned out, that the
proposal would not fit within existing guidelines for government
funding programs. The provincial government response has been
coordinated by the Ministry of the Attorney General. Three meetings
have been held with ministry committees but their mandate has
been more to ease delivery bottlenecks within the existing justice
system than to facilitate structural solutions.
For their part, federal ministries referred the proposal
to the Department of Indian Affairs which declared justice to
be a self-government issue that could not be acted upon until
the current self-government negotiations with the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en Chiefs have been concluded.
Government institutions find it difficult to comprehend
and interact with decentralized societies. Two different traditions
with two different ways of righting wrongs are attempting to deal
with the same problems. Both perspectives have their strengths
but require detailed work to integrate and apply them." (p.3).
With no small irony, the authors also include a BC Court of
Appeal decision for a man charged with the theft of two pick-up
trucks. Though only 22, the man had already experienced a history
of sexual abuse, as well as an extensive prior record of property
crimes. The BC Appeal Court apparently initiated a query back
to the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en community, wondering whether they
could take a more active role in the man's rehabilitation, and
perhaps preclude the need for what would otherwise be yet another
step in an escalating series of incarcerations with no likely
success in sight. The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en responded by telling
the judges of their proposal, its lack of success, and the consequent
lack of structures they had to adequately deal with that particular
offender's case.13
In 1993 (as I write this), we have seen more involvement by
elders in the sentencing process in different jurisdictions in
Canada (e.g., see Griffiths, 1985; Stuart, 1992), and a greater
sensitivity to the need for community-integrated responses to
criminal justice matters involving aboriginal offenders. Will
First Nations like the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en lose out because they
have the continuing integrity to want to do it in a manner which
is consistent with their traditional structures and future aspirations?
Conclusions: Constructing Aboriginal Justice
Aboriginal citizens of the First Nations of Canada are in
a unique position among Canadians, and even among those with ancestral
roots among the three founding nations of the country, to the
extent that they are the one people of this country who can call
North America their homeland. First Nations leaders have indicated
their desire for recognition of their inherent rights to self-determination,
which Canada has recognized to the extent of being signatory to
the First Covenant concerning the rights of "peoples"
to self-determination (Sanders, 1985, 1992a).
There is no end to the legal opinion that suggests that First
Nations have a compelling case to put forth (e.g., see Clark,
1990; Jackson, 1992; Law Reform Commission, 1991; Lyon, 1992;
Mackay, 1992; Macklem, 1992; Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992),
and there is an equally compelling host of moral arguments which
affirm that continuing efforts at assimilating or otherwise obliterating
aboriginal peoples as peoples is beneath the dignity of an ostensibly
free and democratic society that prides itself in having allegiance
to the rule of law (e.g., see Berger, 1991; Boldt & Long,
1985a; Cassidy, 1991b, 1991c; Cassidy & Bish, 1989). Whether
it is through the adversarial procedures of the courts, or through
the more "civil" process of bilateral negotiation, First
Nations people have shown by their actions for more than a century
that they will continue their quest until they achieve what they
have strong reason to believe is their legal and moral due.
The record of the Canadian government to date is not a positive
one. Whether we look back to the efforts in the nineteenth century
to squeeze natives out of their lands (e.g., Fisher, 1992), or
to the efforts to ignore aboriginal rights in the hope they would
go away (e.g., see the British Columbia experience in Tennant,
1991), or to the assimilative policies of "divide and conquer"
embodied in the Indian Act, or the Trudeau-Chretien White
Paper of 1969 which attempted to unilaterally extinguish aboriginal
identity, or to the residential schools where Indians were taught
to be ashamed of their identities and history, or to contemporary
statements that attempt to continue the fiction that aboriginal
rights somehow exist only at the whim of the federal government
(e.g., see Siddon, 1991), the history of aboriginal-governmental
relations is not a source of national pride. Each new generation
of politicians seems interested in creating a "new relationship"
with aboriginal peoples, then continues the assimilative and paternalistic
policies and practices of the one before.
Though it has been said many times before, this paper will
say again that what is needed is a significant change not only
in the procedures and processes by which First Nations and the
federal and provincial governments interact, but also in the very
attitude which the federal government brings to the table. As
Simeon (1991) states, the federal government must appreciate aboriginal
self-government not as a threat to the Canadian federation, but
as an opportunity. If there is a Canadian "image", it
involves tolerance of different cultures, and the belief that
we flourish through the diversity of our peoples. This paper is
in part a call to live up to that image.
Cassidy (1991d) suggests that a foundation for working things
out would be provided by governmental acceptance of two fundamental
principles: (1) that Canada should actively show its new attitude
by recognizing First Nations' peoples as one of the founding peoples
of the country, and affirming their inherent right to self-government
and self-determination, preferably in the Constitution; and (2)
"Canada should not make unilateral policy decisions in relation
to aboriginal peoples of this country." (p.132). Certainly
some steps in this regard have occurred, for example, in the apparent
willingness of the federal and provincial governments to acknowledge
the "inherent right" of aboriginal peoples to self-government
in the failed constitutional proposals of 1992.
Cassidy (1991d) continues by affirming that government should
be partners with First Nations peoples rather than adversaries,
beginning with an acknowledgement of Natives as full partners
in Confederation. Indeed, it is ironic the extent to which the
absence of Quebec from the constitutional fold has been a cause
for national concern for more than a decade, while scant attention
has been paid to the fact that aboriginal peoples have yet to
be formally brought into confederation. Recognition of aboriginal
peoples as one of the three founding nations should arguably be
associated with some substantial participation in this country's
major institutions.
Notwithstanding apparent governmental interest in promoting
aboriginal self-governance, interested observers also acknowledge
that the government is in an inherent conflict of interest to
the extent that it has responsibilities to other than strictly
aboriginal peoples (e.g., see AFN, 1991). This suggests that alternative
structures may be considered to play an intermediary role between
the interests of aboriginal populations, and those of government.
Bellegarde (1991) suggests that an Office of Treaty Rights Protection
be created. Analysts in the justice area have suggested more focussed
entities such as an Aboriginal Justice Commission (Jackson, 1992),
or Aboriginal Justice Institute (Law Reform Commission, 1991),
which would be staffed largely if not solely by aboriginals, would
have a significant and continuous budgetary committment, and whose
jobs would be to be encourage the development of aboriginal justice
systems, promote long-term planning, engage in training and evaluation,
and so forth.
The danger in such a focussed enterprise is that it creates
the sort of specialized structure that has plagued the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
and other First Nations who desire a more 'holistic' approach
to governance, and hence end up lost in the cracks between government
departments and their associated mandates and budgets. If such
Commissions or Institutes are created, the suggestion here is
that these should exist within an umbrella Department of Aboriginal
Affairs which would be prepared to show flexibility in the range
of initiatives which are entertained and promoted.
Although this paper has argued that aboriginal interests should
be acknowledged and promoted, it is also acknowledged that there
are many thorny issues which await both the federal and provincial
governments and aboriginal peoples. Indeed, these are legion.
Who are the aboriginal leaders, and what authority do they have
among the First Nations of the country as a whole, and within
particular First Nations? One might point to Ovide Mercredi and
the Assembly of First Nations at the national level, but not all
First Nations recognize their authority, seeing them as a governmental
creation of pan-Indian identity and a product of band council
government imposed via the Indian Act. Within given First
Nations, "traditionals" and "contemporaries"
debate over the authority to be wielded by traditional and band
council structures; in smaller First Nations, one occasionally
sees the domination of a single family which may or may not represent
the interest of their entire population, and where nepotism and
favouritism run counter to the best of aboriginal traditions of
complete participation and consensus decision-making.
The role of women in contemporary native life poses incredible
complexity. In terms of aboriginal traditions, most sources suggest
that aboriginal First Nations were marked by full equality, with
patriarchy and male dominance introduced only with the advent
of the Europeans, and institutionalized through the Indian
Act (e.g., Greschner, 1992; Monture-Okanee & Turpel, 1992);
others have been more critical and seen inequality even in the
earliest days of the fur trade (e.g., Van Kirk, 1988). Whatever
the distant past, several generations of Indian Act governance,
and particularly the disenfranchisement of many women from Indian
status because of the discriminatory provisions of the Indian
Act regarding inter-marriage, have left many First Nations
women without a voice, and clinging to the equality provisions
of an otherwise non-Aboriginal Charter to ensure reasonable participation.
The material poverty of many reserves is also noteworthy,
and the continuing dependency of most First Nations on governmental
largesse regarding funding (with both explicit and implicit strings
attached), means that appropriate internal controls, financial
structures, and the ability to engage in long-term planning and
development, have been sorely hampered. The irony is that this
governmental largesse is with resources that arguably belong to
the First Nations, and that government has provided a poor model
in terms of how those resources might be effectively managed (e.g.,
see York, 1992, for discussion of items from the most recent Auditor
General's report, showing Indian Affairs mismanagement of reserve
resources, and failure to meet terms of compensation specified
in negotiated agreements).
In yet another of the many ironies which characterize aboriginal-governmental
relations, I would also draw attention to what may be one of the
most subtly assimilative developments to have occured with the
arrival of Christopher Columbus in 1492, i.e., the identification
and construction of a class of people called "Indians".
Notwithstanding general cultural differences that exist between
those of aboriginal and European ancestries, the amalgamation
of all First Nations into a class called "Indians" does
great injustice to the diversity of peoples enjoined by that label.
Notwithstanding counter-examples like the Navajo with its
population of around 200,000, most First Nations in North America
are relatively small tribal groups. Indeed, when the first Europeans
arrived on North American shores, there were several hundred aboriginal
First Nations whose respective territories covered virtually all
of North America. Nonetheless, to the early European explorers,
all these inhabitants were homogenized in the category of "Indians",
even though they belonged to eleven different linguistic groups
(some of which have as much in common as Japanese does to Swahili),
and possessed as much variety in cultures as is evident among
the nations of Africa or Europe.
Several hundred years of treating these various First Nations
as "Indians" has served to some degree to create a perception
of homogeneity that did not exist, and to force a unity that may
pose an uneasy alliance. An analogy would be to imagine an explorer
landing on the shores of medieval France and finding a continent
of people that came to be called "Europeans", even though
to the Europeans themselves there were identifiable language and
cultural differences between the French, and Italians, and Belgians,
and Spaniards, and Portugese, et cetera. We understand
the absurdity of asking "what do Europeans want?", because
we understand that it is unlikely the diverse array of European
nations would want any one thing. And yet many continue to ask
what it is that "Indians" want, oblivious to their homogeneity,
and their historical independence from one another.
How the aboriginal peoples of this country resolve the above
conundra must be recognized as a matter of their own choosing.
We may lament the racism which was shown to permeate Nova Scotia
justice in the Donald Marshall Inquiry (e.g., see Mannette, 1992a),
and Nova Scotians may demand change in the way they go about doing
business, but we do not question the right of the duly constituted
government of Nova Scotia to govern its internal affairs. Similarly,
we may anguish over federal government practices, but we do not
question its existence as our government. Notwithstanding the
many difficulties which true self-government will bring because
of divisions among and within indigenous First Nations, it would
be similarly inappropriate for the federal government and non-aboriginal
Canadians to attach strings to the recognition of aboriginal self-governance.
This would represent little more than a new Indian Act,
with non-aboriginal peoples once again having the audacity to
believe that they know what is best for native peoples.
The appropriate role for non-aboriginal Canadians and their
governments is not only to recognize the rights of aboriginal
Canadians, as peoples, to self-government and self-determination,
but also to refrain from either expecting or imposing unitary
solutions which deny the rights of individual First Nations to
make choices which reflect their own priorities. First Nations
were and are incredibly diverse, as are the contemporary realities
they occupy, and priorities they hold. Pan-Indian government is
a twentieth century creation; although perhaps a necessary evil
in contemporary political life, where the aggregation of critical
mass seems a requirement for the mobilization of a political agenda,
government should not require homogeneity in the solutions that
individual First Nations derive.
Within the particular realm of aboriginal justice, the implications
to the above are several. First, it is clear that the contemporary
Euro-Canadian justice system has by and large completely failed
in bringing justice to aboriginal peoples. Second, the analysis
above suggests that aboriginal justice, at least in its traditional
forms, is in many ways incompatable with the dominant Euro-Canadian
model, to the extent that justice delivery within aboriginal communities
must allow an appearance which differs radically from that in
the dominant system. But third, the diversity of aboriginal First
Nations must be acknowledged by allowing a diversity of arrangements
to be made depending on the priorities and practices of individual
First Nations. While First Nations like the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
and Mi'kmaq may wish to pursue more traditional forms, for example
[e.g., see Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Education Centre et al. (1989)
and Denny (1992), respectively], others may wish to pursue tribal
courts, or an indigenization of the existing system, or be happy
with things just as they are now.
Of course, it is also the case that aboriginal Canadians will
not exist in a vacuum; notwithstanding recognition of their right
to self-determination, aboriginals have no apparent interest in
not being a part of Canada. Coordinated existence will
thus be required, with consideration made for the division of
jurisdiction. Regarding general governance issues, for example,
Joe (1991) suggests that there should be lands over which the
relevant First Nation would have complete control (i.e., reserve
lands), but also other areas where they would have input over
development (e.g., traditional hunting lands that are now officially
in the hands of the Crown), plus other areas where they would
have input purely because they would be impacted upon by some
sort of development elsewhere.
In the realm of aboriginal justice, he suggests that First
Nations have complete power to administer justice, which he would
extend not only to First Nations citizens, but also "...those
who have violated First Nations laws within the domain of that
First Nation." (p.70). As has been the case in the United
States, cases will most certainly arise where jurisdictional boudaries
are tested in court, e.g., where a non-aboriginal who is alleged
to have offended on aboriginal land asserts his or her right to
be tried in a provincial court, and/or where an aboriginal person
argues that he or she does not wish to be subject to aborinal
law, or wishes to contest the result of an aboriginal dispute
resolution (e.g., see Jackson, 1992), and/or where an aboriginal
accused in urban Vancouver demands to be tried by an aboriginal
justice.
Despite differences between traditional aboriginal and contemporary
Euro-Canadian justice, the common ground they share should also
be recognized. Indeed, the flourishing concurrent systems may
well have much to offer one another.
As Jackson (1992) argues, some of the central tenets of aboriginal
justice are now receiving attention in the dominant justice system,
e.g., under the title of "alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms" and "mediation". And the model of justice
offered by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, for example (see Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
Education Centre et al., 1989), may well hold useful implications
for other smaller, non-aboriginal communities. In other domains,
some observers have argued that we may have much to learn from
aboriginal cultures regarding, for example, environmental practices
(e.g., see Ross, 1992); certainly the indigenous peoples were
successful for millennia in practicing sustainable development.
Diversity is strength; we will all benefit from an acknowledgement
of aboriginals' central role not only in Canadian history, but
also in our collective future.
Footnotes
1. Reprints of this article may be obtained by contacting
Ted Palys at the School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University,
Burnaby, BC, Canada, V5A 1S6, or via Internet at PALYS@SFU.CA.
2. I feel uneasy noting "contact", since it is clearly
a construction open to definition by whomever writes the history.
For example, reports exist of visits by Asians to the west coast
more than 1,500 years ago. Sewid-Smith (1991) states that an official
yearbook of the Chinese Empire tells of the return of a Buddhist
priest named Hoei-shin, who had apparently spent the years from
458 to 499 A.D. in the area around what is now known as Vancouver.
We have also heard of visitations as long as 900 years by the
Norse to the east coast. Nonetheless, European historians generally
date "contact" between aboriginal and non-aboriginal
populations in what is now called Canada as having begun with
the visit of Giovanni Caboto, a European, of course, to what is
now Newfoundland in 1497, i.e., slightly less than 500 years ago.
3. I state "documentary" authority here because
this is the level at which most court argument regarding aboriginal
rights to self-determination occurs. This places us in the realm
of international law (e.g., Green & Dickason, 1989;
Slattery, 1991), which includes the full history of Canada and
its ancestors' relations among nations, including any International
Covenants to which Canada is signatory. This is often interpreted
to be a history written largely by Europeans, i.e., that developed
among the European nations who were actively involved in exploration
and colonization from the Crusades onward.
Other sources are also cited. Many native speakers
emphasize that it is the Creator who gave aboriginals the
stewardship of this continent, for example, with authority for
self-determination deriving directly therefrom (e.g., see Ahenakew,
1985; Boldt & Long, 1985a; Cassidy, 1991c). Natural law
is also cited, since one can question the determinative aspects
of international law -- Proclamations by European Kings can hardly
be considered binding on leaders of North American First Nations
who were not signatory. Believing otherwise gives any beligerent
authority the power to write its own rules (e.g., see Slattery,
1991). The Creator is addressed only tangentially from this point
onward in the paper. Justifications on the basis of international
law and/or natural law are discussed further below.
4. Clark (1990) reports that Canadian judges often look to
the United States for precedents, believing that the two countries
are similar in both (a) having once been subject to the Royal
Proclamation; (b) having British ancestry to their legal systems;
and (c) now possessing sovereign authority over their respective
indigenous populations. He argues they are mistaken in doing so,
however. The American Revolutionary War served to disrupt the
inheritance of British influence; from Clark's (1990) perspective,
this made the United States a new lineage with its own sovereign
authority, and therefore not necessarily subject to earlier Proclamations
by the authority they rejected. In contrast, the loyal Canadians
followed colonial authority in their progression to independence,
and hence were subject to all inherited encumbrances, including
those expressed in the Royal Proclamation.
5. Mr. Justice Louis-Philippe Pigeon agreed that B.C. law
stated the province could not be sued without their consent, and
noted that the natives had not sought the province's consent before
taking them to court. He did not comment on the merit of the Nisga'a
claim per se.
6. As Fisher (1992) has noted, however disagreeable MacEachern's
decision might be, the fact remains that it was made in 1991 by
a Chief Justice in an important case that has the potential of
exerting significant influence in future cases, shows the power
of "standard" histories in reflecting and serving assimilative
interests which show no respect for aboriginal beliefs and traditions.
7. The term "robber baron" is chosen in recollection
of W.B. Henderson's (1992) statement that "The law has had
great difficulty dealing with the doctrine of aboriginal rights.
Whereas lawyers and the courts tend to view aboriginal rights
as a question of law, native people view the issue as one of justice,
having to do with what is right, fair, reasonable, or equitable.
... The law is an imperfect device for dealing with questions
of justice; but St. Augustine wrote many centuries ago that without
justice the state is nothing but a robber band. Most people who
have not gone to law school would be surprised to learn how little
the law is actually concerned with justice. The law is primarily
concerned with problem-solving." (p.222). Later, the author
notes that "The judge is sometimes in the position of a person
doing a crossword puzzle who, lacking the right answer at the
end of the puzzle, settles for a word that seems to fit."
(p.223).
8. Tennant (1992a) explains that "S'ul Hwen" is
the Salish term for what others might call an "elder";
the "glottal" stop between the two words makes a 'k'
sound, so that the pronunciation is something like Sul-kwain.
9. Hamilton and Sinclair (1991, p.275) state the two different
numbers appear in two different Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
reports. The lower figure of 91 [from Indian Reservation Criminal
Justice Task Force Analysis, published by BIA (1975)], notes
16 traditional courts, 17 CIOs, and 58 tribal courts. If the general
ratios of the different types of courts reflect the situation
in 1975, it suggests that the biggest increases in the numbers
of aboriginal courts have come in the category of Tribal Courts,
which increased from the 58 noted above, to 108 a decade later.
10. One is on touchy ground with this sort of assertion, since
there was considerable variation among First Nations in the specifics
of how justice issues were resolved, and any talk of some "characteristic"
aboriginal justice necessarily errs in imposing homogeneity. Notwithstanding
such variation, authors in the literature suggest that this represents
more in the realm of variations on a theme, as is true also among
European legal traditions. The central themes of the two aggregates
vary so widely, however, that it is meaningful to talk about general
differences between them.
11. In and of itself, this inability to adequately translate
the concept of guilt into aboriginal languages is extremely problematic,
and can obviously lead to great misunderstanding to the detriment
of the aboriginal accused. Monture-Okanee and Turpel (1992), for
example, note a revelation of the Donald Marshall Inquiry to the
effect that many Mi'kmaq translated the question "Do you
plead guilty?", to mean "Are you being blamed?"
One look around the courtroom would be more than adequate to suggest
the answer was "Yes".
12. This may sound rather like kidnapping, though it also
shares features with arrest. In both cases, a key question concerns
whatever safeguards are in place for such eventualities, and the
source of authority of the person instigating the grabbing, as
well as the person doing it.
13. Incidentally, to compound irony upon irony, one of the
three BC Court of Appeal Justices who made the sentencing decision
alluded to above was the same Justice who later concluded in the
case of Delgamuukw versus The Queen (1991) that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
had nothing in their traditional societies which might be called
"law" or "justice".
References
Ahenakew, David. (1985). Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights:
The impossible and unnecessary task of identification and definition.
In M. Boldt and J.A. Long (Eds.). The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal
Peoples and Aboriginal Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, pp.24-30.
Assembly of First Nations. (1991). A critique of federal government
land claims policies. In F.Cassidy (Ed.) Aboriginal Self-Determination.
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